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A noncitizen facing deportation from the United States must obtain a stay of
removal to avoid being deported while his federal appeal is pending. In its 2009
decision in Nken v. Holder, the Supreme Court attempted to clarify the doctrinal
standard for obtaining such a stay. 1 However, key parts of the decision now
stand on shaky ground because subsequent litigation has revealed that the
Solicitor General's Office misled the Court to believe that procedures were in
place to bring wrongfully deported individuals back to the United States if they
ultimately won their appeals. 2 In addition, the federal circuit courts of appeal
are split on how to apply the Nken standard.
The government's rush to deport first and resolve appeals later stems from a
belief that many noncitizens abuse the appeals process to remain in the United
States for a longer period of time. This fear assumes that filing an appeal
actually buys a significant amount of time. The opening line of Chief Justice
Roberts's majority opinion in Nken recognized the critical role of time, but could
only vaguely note: "It takes time to decide a case on appeal. Sometimes a little;
sometimes a lot." 3 Unpacking fears of abuse therefore requires exploring how
long the appellate process actually takes.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy lamented the lack of available
empirical data about how the federal courts of appeals actually handle stays of
removal, recognizing that such data would help the Court analyze whether the
standard for granting stays is fair and effective.4 This Article presents new
empirical data that shows that common assumptions about the duration of
immigration appeals are actually false. The government's arguments to the
Supreme Court about the danger that stays of removal pose were founded on
these misperceptions. This new data should affect how liberally appellate courts
1. Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749 (2009).
2. Jess Bravin, Immigration Case Challenges Justice Department's Credibility, WALL ST.
J. (Mar. 13, 2012, 10:58 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405297020396
1204577272053518420934.
3. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1754.
4. Id. at 1762-63 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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grant stays of removal and assist the Supreme Court in resolving the circuit split
over the application of the Nken standard.
As immigration cases proceed from immigration courts to the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) to the U.S. Courts of Appeals, adjudicators at every
level must strike a delicate balance between avoiding undue delay and
preventing errant deportations. Federal appellate courts in particular must walk
this tightrope with enormous care because effectively they are the last barrier to
removal. These courts face the formidable challenge of deciding whether to
grant a stay at the very beginning of the appeal, before having an opportunity to
thoroughly examine the issues in the case. Moreover, the stakes are often
extremely high. For example, if the judge errs in an asylum case, the petitioner
could be sent to a country in which she faces a risk of persecution or torture.
The circuit courts deal with these challenges differently. Some grant stays of
removal fairly liberally, while others grant them only rarely.5 These variations
are associated with different approaches to applying the standard for stays of
removal. 6 In Nken, the Supreme Court held that the traditional four-part test for
preliminary injunctions applies to stays of removal, rejecting a more stringent
standard.' Yet the circuit courts remain divided over whether to use a "sliding
scale" approach in applying the four-part test, with which a stronger showing on
one factor permits a lesser showing on another, or a strict, sequential approach,
which involves analyzing each factor independently.8 We previously found that
courts using the "sliding scale" approach produce fewer "false negatives" (cases
in which the stay was denied but the appeal was ultimately granted), thereby
protecting more people from wrongful deportations.9 However, the sliding scale
approach also correlates to a higher number of "false positives" (cases in which
the stay was granted but the appeal was ultimately denied), allowing many
noncitizens to delay valid deportations.10 The Supreme Court must therefore
strike a difficult balance to clarify the doctrinal standard for granting stays.
To shed light on the real potential for undue delay that results from granting
a stay of removal, we collected information from over 1600 cases in the eleven
federal circuit courts that hear immigration petitions." Our data indicate that in
most circuits, delay is less of a concern than previously thought. We found that
the average processing time for an immigration appeal was under nine months,
and cases dismissed for lack of jurisdiction or procedural reasons-as frivolous
appeals are more likely to be-were usually resolved in less than six months.
5. See Fatma Marouf, Michael Kagan & Rebecca Gill, Justice on the Fly: The Danger of
Errant Deportations, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 337, 341 (2014).
6. Id.
7. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1761-62 (2009).
8. See Marouf, Kagan & Gill, supra note 5, at 350-51.
9. Id. at 341.
10. Id.
11. The D.C. Circuit does not contain an immigration court, so the circuit does not have
jurisdiction over petitions for review of removal orders and was therefore omitted from our study.
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These results suggest that concerns about delay are overblown and that the risk
of wrongful deportation is the more urgent issue that courts should consider in
setting the standard for granting stays.
Our analysis also demonstrates the importance of court management in
understanding how the wheels of justice actually turn. The doctrinal standard
for granting a stay of removal is only part of the equation. Courts must also
consider the implications of different procedures that can expedite or delay
cases. Our examination of the duration of appeals, circuit by circuit, revealed
different patterns in the speeds of adjudication. For example, focusing on the
two circuits that handle over 70% of all immigration appeals, we found that
nearly half of the Ninth Circuit's cases are resolved in less than six months,
whereas only about 25% of the Second Circuit's cases are resolved in that time
period. These differences appear to result from different case management
practices. 12 Although the government argued to the Supreme Court in Nken that
the Ninth Circuit is opening the door to abuse of the appellate process,13 this
concern actually appears far more valid in the Second Circuit, where cases take
much longer to resolve. In the Ninth Circuit, there seems to be little harm in
granting stays of removal liberally because the court disposes of frivolous cases
fairly quickly.
At the same time, this study demonstrates that strategies designed to increase
efficiency in adjudicating motions may compromise the quality of
decision-making. These procedures include reducing the size of the panel that
decides the stay motion, streamlining the process for voting in ways that may
reduce the level of independent scrutiny, lessening the amount of explanation (if
any) provided in the decision, and increasing the reliance on staff attorneys to
pre-screen cases. As courts strive to strike the correct balance between
protecting a noncitizen's right to a meaningful appeal and preventing abuse of
the legal process, they should pay attention to available data on the impact of
these different procedural practices.
Part I of the Article shows that frivolous immigration filings are a major
governmental concern and explores various theories proposed by the
government and some judges to explain how and why noncitizens may abuse the
appellate process to buy time. It exposes the weaknesses in these theories and
proposes alternative explanations for certain behavior of noncitizen litigants.
Part II presents the key findings from our empirical study of the duration of
immigration appeals and illustrates the implications for courts concerned with
the potential for abuse. Finally, Part III offers recommendations to the executive
and judicial branches to address these concerns.
12. The Ninth and Second Circuits are the only two courts that offer temporary protection
from removal to any petitioner who requests a temporary stay. See infra Part I.F. (discussing the
case management procedures of the Second and Ninth Circuits).
13. Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1762-63 (2009) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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I. STAYS OF REMOVAL AND THE FEAR OF DELAY
For decades, the government has expressed concerns about noncitizens filing
frivolous or fraudulent immigration applications to stay in the country. Despite
numerous efforts to deter such filings, the fear remains. Concerns about abuse
are especially acute appeals to the federal circuit courts, in part because
frivolousness is particularly difficult to define at that level of adjudication.
Consequently, the government has approached stays of removal with great
caution. Yet the government's various theories of delay-seeking behavior do
not withstand close scrutiny and contradict empirical evidence, suggesting that
delay may not be the motivation of noncitizens to pursue federal appeals.
A. Efforts to Deter Frivolous Appeals
The idea that would-be immigrants might abuse the courts to delay inevitable
deportation stems from a general concern about immigration fraud. Asylum
fraud became a popular subject in 2011, after the woman who accused
Dominique Strauss-Kahn of sexual assault admitted that she lied on her asylum
application. 14 The New York Times reported that asylum fraud schemes are
common, describing the lawyers, notarios, and "chop shops" that peddle stock
stories to immigrants who are desperately searching for ways to remain in the
United States.15 The next month, the New Yorker published an article about
asylum-seekers embellishing their experiences to strengthen their claims. 16
Serious investigations into asylum fraud followed, and, in 2012, twenty-six
individuals, including six lawyers, were charged in the Southern District of New
York for submitting hundreds of fabricated asylum applications on behalf of
Chinese immigrants.17  Such accounts naturally foment fears that countless
noncitizens are abusing the legal process.18
Fears of frivolous and fraudulent immigration applications are not new. They
have plagued the government since asylum offices were first established in the
United States in the early 1990s. 19 Numerous regulatory and statutory changes
14. Sam Dolnick, Asylum Ploys Play Off News to Open Door, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2011, at
Al, A19.
15. Id.
16. Suketu Mehta, The Asylum Seeker, THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 1, 2011, at 32.
17. Press Release, U.S. Att'y's Office for the S. Dist. of N.Y., Twenty-Six Individuals,
Including Six Lawyers, Charged in Manhattan Federal Court With Participation in Immigration
Fraud Schemes Involving Hundreds of Fraudulent Asylum Applications, (Dec. 18, 2012), available
at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/Decemberl2/AsylumFraudChargesPR.php.
18. See, e.g., Diane Uchimiya, A Blackstone's Ratio for Asylum: Fighting Fraud While
Preserving Due Process for Asylum Seekers, 26 PENN ST. INT'L L. REv. 383, 416 (2007)
(discussing how immigration judges rely on general reports about asylum fraud in their decisions
in individual cases).
19. See Gregg A. Beyer, Reforming Affirmative Asylum Processing in the United States:
Challenges and Opportunity, 9 Am. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 43, 51-52 (1994). Far more people
than expected began submitting asylum applications, which made the system appear vulnerable to
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over the past two decades sought to address these concerns. In 1995, the
executive branch introduced regulatory changes aimed at curbing asylum
fraud.20 In 1996, Congress amended the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
to render noncitizens who file frivolous asylum applications permanently
ineligible for immigration benefits. 2 1 In 2002, the Attorney General issued a
regulation that allows a single member of the BIA to summarily dismiss an
appeal that is "filed for an improper purpose, such as to cause unnecessary
delay" or that "lacks an arguable basis in fact or law." 22 In 2005, Congress
passed the REAL ID Act, which demanded more corroborating evidence from
asylum seekers and set a lenient standard for adverse credibility
determinations. 23 More recently, the BIA and circuit courts have repeatedly
tried to clarify the standard for determining whether an asylum application is
frivolous. 24
Rule of Appellate Procedure 46(c) permits a federal court to "discipline an
attorney who practices before it for conduct unbecoming a member of the bar or
abuse. See id. at 50-51 (noting that "the system is ripe for fraud and abuse"); Tim Weiner, Pleas
for Asylum Inundate System for Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1993, at Al.
20. Rules and Procedures for Adjudication of Applications for Asylum or Withholding of
Deportation and for Employment Authorization, 59 Fed. Reg. 14,779 (proposed Mar. 30, 1994)
(codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 203, 208, 236, 242, 274a); see also David A. Martin, The 1995 Asylum
Reforms, CENTER FOR IMMIGR. STUD. (May 2000), www.cis.org/1995AsylumReforms. The
reforms attempted to address a backlog that made the system appear vulnerable to abuse by making
processing of applications more efficient and delaying the availability of a work permit. Id.; see
also Deborah Anker, The Mischaracterized Asylum Crisis: Realities Behind Proposed Reforms, 9
AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 29, 30-31 (1994) (discussing an empirical study by Harvard Law
School's immigration and refugee program that challenged public perceptions about abuse).
21. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(4)(A), (d)(6); INA § 208(d)(4)(A), (d)(6). The 1996 amendments also
imposed a one-year filing deadline for asylum to discourage fraudulent applications. U.S. Gov'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-940, U.S. ASYLUM SYSTEM: SIGNIFICANT VARIATION
EXISTED IN ASYLUM OUTCOMES ACROSS IMMIGRATION COURTS AND JUDGES 3 (2008),
[hereinafter GAO REPORT], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08940.pdf. Congress has
since questioned "whether the resources expended on adjudicating the [one-year] rule outweigh its
effectiveness in deterring fraud." Id.
22. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(2)(i)(D) (2013) (stating that a Board member may dismiss an appeal
if he "is satisfied, from a review of the record, that the appeal is filed for an improper purpose, such
as to cause unnecessary delay, or that the appeal lacks an arguable basis in fact or law unless the
Board determines that it is supported by a good faith argument for extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law"). The 2002 regulations also provide that an attorney who files a frivolous
appeal may be subject to disciplinary action. Id. § 1003.1(d)(2)(iii).
23. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 101(a), 119 Stat. 302, 302-03 (codified at
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B) (2012)).
24. See, e.g., Yan Liu v. Holder, 640 F.3d 918, 922 (9th Cir. 2011); Khadka v. Holder, 618
F.3d 996, 1002 (9th Cir. 2010); Chen v. Mukasey, 527 F.3d 935, 940 (9th Cir. 2008); Biao Yang
v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 279 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (remanding for clarification by the
BIA); Matter of X-M-C-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 322, 324 (BIA 2010); Matter of B-Y-, 25 I. & N. Dec.
236, 238-39 (BIA 2010); In re Y-L-, 24 1. & N. Dec. 151, 157 (BIA 2007).
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for failure to comply with any court rule." 25 Rule 46(c) provides a practical way
to respond to abusive patterns of attorney behavior that are easier to identify and
assess than the merits of an individual case. Any given appeal may totter on the
border between being frivolous or weak, but a pattern of failing to file briefs or
respond to court orders is easier to catch.26 In some cases, such conduct may
result from incompetence or an overwhelming caseload, but in other cases, the
attorney may be filing meritless appeals simply to buy time for clients. 27 Some
courts have supplemented Rule 46(c) with local rules that impose harsh
consequences and sanctions for specific types of abuses by both attorneys
and pro se petitioners. 28
Flagrant attorney misuse of the appellate process may also result in state bar
sanctions. In 2010, the Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the suspension of a
Memphis attorney who had filed eighteen immigration appeals with the Sixth
Circuit and, in each case, had failed to pay the filing fees, file required forms, or
submit an opening brief, resulting in dismissal of the appeals. 29 Noting that the
"filing of frivolous appeals 'is a recurring problem in immigration practice,"'30
the Tennessee Supreme Court found that the attorney had "exploited a
procedural mechanism" and "abandoned the balance between zealously
25. FED. R. App. P. 46(c). The Supreme Court held that conduct "unbecoming a member of
the bar" may include any conduct that is "contrary to professional standards that shows an unfitness
to discharge continuing obligations to clients or the courts, or conduct inimical to the administration
ofjustice." In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 645 (1985).
26. The Second Circuit has publicly reprimanded attorneys who have filed abusive
immigration appeals. In one case in which the court issued a reprimand in a published decision,
the attorney defaulted on scheduling orders in fourteen cases, withdrew a number of appeals after
the briefing deadlines had passed, and filed a deficient brief that waived a dispositive argument.
In re Payne, 707 F.3d 195, 198-99 (2d Cir. 2013). In another case, the attorney had a history of
missing deadlines and submitted a deficient brief in at least one case in which the motive to appeal
was admittedly to gain time until another form of relief became available. In re Guttlein, 378 F.
App'x 24, 25 (2d Cir. 2010).
27. Concerns about attorneys' dilatory behavior are not new. An 1893 article published in
the Yale Law Journal noted:
There are two classes of lawyers who are always demanding delay. First, those whose
natural indolence resents any demand for action as a personal injury; second, the
excessively busy ones who have managed to get under their control more cases than their
time and strength will enable them to dispose of, and who remind one continually of a
hen trying to hatch out more eggs than she can cover.
Talcott H. Russel, The Law's Delay, 2 YALE L.J. 95, 102 (1893). The author appears to have
overlooked the category of lawyers seeking delay on behalf of their clients.
28. See, e.g., SECOND CIR. LOCAL R. 31.2(d) (granting the court the power to "dismiss an
appeal or take other appropriate action for failure to timely file a brief or to meet a deadline");
SECOND CIR. LOCAL R. 38.1 ("The court may, after affording notice and an opportunity to be heard,
impose sanctions on a party that: (a) fails to file a brief, the appendix, or any required form within
the time specified by FRAP or a rule or order of this court, or (b) takes or fails to take any other
action for the purpose of causing unnecessary delay.").
29. Flowers v. Bd. Of Prof'1 Responsibility, 314 S.W.3d 882, 887 (Tenn. 2010).
30. Id. at 897 (quoting Robert G. Heiserman & Linda K. Pacun, Professional Responsibility
in Immigration Practice and Government Services, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 971, 980-81 (1985)).
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representing his clients and the rules for the professional performance of his
vocation."31
Although the Tennessee case is a fairly extreme example, federal courts still
struggle to define frivolousness. Although Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
38 grants the courts of appeals the authority to sanction appellants and attorneys
who pursue "frivolous" appeals, but there is no clear test to for frivolity.32
Courts remain divided over whether frivolousness can be defined simply by the
objective "reasonably prudent attorney" test, or whether the attorney must also
demonstrate bad faith.33
One common approach is the actuarial approach, which defines frivolousness
as a low likelihood of success, or by combining the likelihood of success with
an estimate of the cost of litigation. 34 This framework is best applied to civil
suits for money damages. The question is often whether the costs of litigation
outweigh what is at stake in the case, and whether the transaction costs of
litigation distort outcomes by leading to settlement of meritless cases. 35 This
quantitative approach to frivolousness does not represent how humans actually
think about probabilities or how they make decisions. 36 People will often pursue
low probability cases if there is a remote prospect of a big reward.37 Moreover,
in cases in which the stakes are extremely high-such as immigration cases,
which risk the "loss of both property and life; or of all that makes life worth
living" 38 -applying a traditional cost-benefit analysis is not possible.
The general difficulty in defining, identifying, and responding to frivolous
appeals explains why the government has approached stays of removal with such
great caution. In Nken, the government argued that noncitizens seek to
31. Id. at 898; see also Bill Dries, Suspension Highlights Immigration Advocacy Issues,
MEMPHIS DAILY NEWS, June 10, 2010, http://www.memphisdailynews.com/news/2010/jun
/10/suspension-higlights-immigration-advocacy-issues//print (discussing the court's opinion).
32. FED. R. APP. P. 38; CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER
& JOAN E. STEINMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3984.1 (4th ed. 2008) (noting the
lack of clear test for frivolity).
33. See Scott A. Martin, Keeping Courts Afloat in a Rising Sea of Litigation: An Objective
Approach to Imposing Rule 38 Sanctions for Frivolous Appeals, 100 MICH. L. REv. 1156,
1159-61 (2002) (discussing the "reasonably prudent attorney" standard); Robert J. Martineau,
Frivolous Appeals: The Uncertain Federal Response, 1984 DUKE L.J. 845, 850 (1984) (elaborating
on the requirement of bad faith).
34. See Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 519, 529-31 (1997).
35. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Frivolous Litigation and Civil Justice Reform: Miscasting
the Problem, Recasting the Solution, 54 DUKE L.J. 447, 465 (2004) (describing the impact of
attorney fees on the disposition of a case).
36. See Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U. CHI. L.
REv. 163, 188-89 (2000).
37. Guthrie explains that if a plaintiff has a 1% chance of winning $5000, the actuarial
approach would suggest that the case should be worth fifty dollars. Id. But the vast majority of
test subjects refuse a fifty-dollar settlement offer in this scenario, preferring to pursue the remote
chance of winning a much larger prize. Id.
38. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
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manipulate the courts to delay removal in many different ways. 39 In an amicus
brief, the Washington Legal Foundation more bluntly stated that "a
court-imposed delay in removal is a victory for the alien." 40 In other words,
from the government's perspective, deportation delayed is justice denied. Based
in large part on its fear of delay-seeking behavior, the government argued for a
stringent stay standard, adopted only by the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits, that
required "clear and convincing evidence that the entry or execution of such
[removal] order is prohibited as a matter of law." 41 This standard reflected the
government's view that a stay should be an "extraordinary remedy." 42
Although the Court rejected the clear and convincing standard and held that
the traditional four-part test for preliminary injunctions applies to stays of
removal,43 Chief Justice Roberts's majority opinion acknowledged the tension
between efficient execution of removal orders and the time required for quality
decision-making.t Yet the opening lines of the opinion suggest that quality
adjudication comes first. The Court stressed that holding a ruling in abeyance
provides adequate time for an appellate court to decide a case on the merits. 45 it
also cautioned that "[t]he choice for a reviewing court should not be between
justice on the fly or participation in what may be an idle ceremony." 46
B. Theories of Maximum and Specific Delay
Although Nken generally discussed the critical role of time, the Court never
explicitly addressed the government's argument that noncitizens abuse the
appellate process to delay deportation. This may have been a tactical choice to
avoid highlighting concerns about abusive appeals in a decision that adopted the
more lenient of two proposed standards for stays. The Court also lacked the
empirical data to effectively evaluate this argument. 47
39. Brief for the Respondent at 10, Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749 (2009) (No. 08-681),
2009 WL 45980 at *10.
40. Brief of the Washington Legal Foundation and Allied Educational Foundation as Amici
Curiae in Support of the Respondent at 7, Nken, 129 S. Ct. 1749 (No. 08-681), 2009 WL 75556 at
*7.
41. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1756.
42. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 39, at 46 (quoting Winter v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 376 (2008)).
43. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1756 (quoting Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987)) ("[A]
court considers four factors: '(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is
likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay;
(3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the
proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies."').
44. Id. at 1756-57 ("The parties and the public, while entitled to both careful review and a
meaningful decision, are also generally entitled to the prompt execution of orders that the
legislature has made final.").
45. Id. at 1754.
46. Id. at 1757 (quoting Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 10 (1942)).
47. Id. at 1762-63 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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In the Nken briefs, the government vaguely discussed the issue of delay
without explaining why and how motivation to delay leads certain immigrants
to file frivolous appeals in federal court.48 One argument is that immigrants
simply wish to remain in the United States for as long as possible, and therefore
attempt to lengthen the adjudication process in any way possible. However, this
was not actually the theory that the executive branch promoted in the years
leading up to Nken.
By 2009, the courts were concerned with the number immigration cases on
the federal appellate docket. Petitions to the federal courts surged after the
Attorney General initiated reforms of the BIA in 2002 that streamlined its
decision-making, allowing single-member panels to affirm the decisions of
immigration judges. 49 Critics claim that the surge in appeals to the court was
the consequence of lower-quality decisions by the BIA after streamlining.50 In
response, the government argued that the increase in appeals resulted from a
desire by noncitizens to delay deportation.5 1 However, the simple desire to delay
deportation for as long as possible does not explain the post-2002 surge in
appeals because noncitizens could delay deportation by appealing to the federal
courts even before streamlining. The theory that noncitizens seek maximum
delay thus cannot explain the increase in immigration appeals after BIA
streamlining.
As a result, the government developed a more nuanced theory of delay,
suggesting that immigrants seek to stay in the United States for a specific period
of time to earn a certain amount of money before returning home.52 According
48. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 39, at 35-36 (quoting Teshhome-Gebreegziabher v.
Mukasey, 528 F.3d 330, 335 (4th Cir. 2008, abrogated by Nken, 129 S. Ct. 1749).
49. See Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management,
67 Fed. Reg. 54,878 (Aug. 26, 2002) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 3).
50. Michael M. Hethmon, Tsunami Watch on the Coast of Bohemia: The BIA Streamlining
Reforms and Judicial Review of Expulsion Orders, 55 CATH. U. L. REv. 999, 1008 (2006) (citing
E-Mail from Larry Levine, Counsel for Legislative and Public Affairs, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
Stuart Drown, City Editor, The Sacramento Bee (Sept. 21, 2004), available at
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/LtrtoEditorSacBee.pdf).
51. Id. (citing Exec. Office of Immigration Review, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Fact Sheet: BIA
Restructuring and Streamlining Procedures (Mar. 9 2006), available at http://www.justice.
gov/eoir/press/06/BIAStreamliningFactSheet030906.htm.
52. See Jon 0. Newman, The Second Circuit's Expedited Adjudication of Asylum Cases, 74
BROOK. L. REv. 429, 431-32 (2009). Second Circuit Judge Jon 0. Newman explained that
[o]ne theory for the increased rate of appeal holds that the BIA's streamlined procedures
were largely responsible because they drastically reduced the time an alien could expect
to remain in this country while his or her case languished in the administrative process.
Many aliens, this theory maintains, hope to remain here for about five years in order to
earn money for themselves and relatives back home. With their cases moving through
the administrative process in less than one year, a petition for review in a court of appeals,
with the likely prospect of a stay of removal while the petition was pending, afforded
hope of maintaining a five year residence in this country with the petition remaining in
the judicial process for four years.
Id.
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to the theory of specific delay, if the BIA process took longer, more noncitizens
were able to achieve their specific desired period of delay without resort to the
federal courts; once the BIA became faster, they had to appeal to the next level
to achieve the same period of delay. 53 This specific delay theory built on the
unquestioned fact that the 2002 reforms did make the BIA faster. In 2000, it
took the BIA an average of 1,100 days (roughly three years) to decide appeals. 54
By 2006, an appeal to the BIA took an average of only 400 days (just over one
year).
Nevertheless, the specific delay hypothesis has several flaws. First, it predicts
that the longer the BIA takes to decide a case, the less likely the noncitizen is to
appeal to the federal courts, and, the faster the BIA decides, the more likely the
noncitizen is to file a petition for review. Yet previous research has shown that
the opposite is true. In cases in which the BIA takes longer to decide a case, the
noncitizen is more likely to appeal to the circuit court. 56
Second, the specific delay theory does not explain why noncitizens appeal
from detention, as they often cannot gain anything by appealing except more
time in confinement.57 If immigration detainees consented to removal from the
country, they could escape detention much sooner. However, appeals from
detainees to the BIA increased by 28% from 2007 to 2011, suggesting that a
genuine desire to avoid deportation, rather than prolonging the case for a certain
period of time to earn money in the United States, may in fact be the primary
motivation for appeals.58
Third, the specific delay theory does not explain why most noncitizens never
pursue any type of appeal at all. In 2011, noncitizens appealed only 8% of
53. See John R. B. Palmer, Stephen W. Yale-Loehr & Elizabeth Cronin, Why are So Many
People Challenging Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions in Federal Court? An Empirical
Analysis of the Recent Surge in Petitions for Review, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 5 (2005).
54. GAO REPORT, supra note 21, at 50 & fig.8. Detained cases, in particular, have been
processed more quickly since streamlining. In 2009, the BIA Chairman reported that detained cases
must be completed within 150 days, but they are usually completed within ninety-five days. Maria
Baldini-Potermin, Practice Before the Board of Immigration Appeals: Recent Roundtable and
Additional Practice Tips, 86 INTERPRETER RELEASES 2009, 2011 (2009).
55. GAO REPORT, supra note 21, at 50.
56. Palmer et al., supra note 53, at 54-55, 65 ("We found that the pool of sampled BIA
decisions that were challenged in petitions for review were, on average, older than the pool of
sampled BIA decisions that were not challenged. The mean age of the pool of decisions that were
challenged in petitions for review was 1276 days (3.5 years), while the mean age of the BIA
decision that were not challenged was 1051 days (2.9 years).").
57. The Ninth Circuit permits a detained petitioner who is granted a stay of removal by the
court to seek a bond hearing before the immigration judges and be released. See Casas-Castrillon
v. Department of Homeland Security, 535 F.3d 942, 948 (2008). Most other circuits have not
followed this approach.
58. ExEc. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FY 2011
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK W1 (2012) [hereinafter FY 2011 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK], available at
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fyllsyb.pdf.
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immigration court decisions to the BIA 59 and filed only 6,300 petitions for
review with the federal appellate courts. 60 That same year, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) removed 396,906 people from the United States.61
Even if many appeals are frivolous, they do not frustrate the government's
general ability to enforce immigration laws. In fact, the appellate process is
marginal to the overall scale of immigration enforcement in the United States.
Figure 1 below demonstrates the paucity of appeals. 62
FIGURE 1: IMMIGRATION APPEALS COMPARED TO REMOVALS IN 2011
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59. Id. at Xl. Both the Department of Homeland Security and the respondent noncitizen may
appeal to the BIA in removal cases. Id. In 2011, the BIA received at total of 27,237. Id. at S2.
Noncitizens filed 17,090 of those appeals. Id. at Xl.
60. See U.S. COURTS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 58 (2011) [hereinafter
NINTH CIRCUIT ANNUAL REPORT], available at http://www.ce9.uscourts.gov/publications/Annual
Report2011.pdf (noting that the Ninth Circuit handled 2,963 BIA appeals, close to 47% of BIA
appeals filed nationwide in 2011).
61. Press Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, U.S. Dep't of Homeland
Security, FY 2011: ICE Announces Year-End Removal Numbers, Highlights Focus on Key
Priorities Including Threats to Public Safety and National Security (Oct. 18, 2011), available at
http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1110/111018washingtondc.htm.
62. Id.; FY 2011 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note 58, at S2, Xl; NINTH CIRCUIT
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 60, at 58.
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Finally, only about half of the noncitizens who appeal to the circuit courts
actually request a stay of removal.63 This is true for both pro se and represented
petitioners.6 In three circuits, more than 60% of petitioners never request a stay,
and in five circuits only around half do so. 6 5 This data contradicts the theory
that the desire to delay deportation drives noncitizens to go to court because half
never even ask the court to stay their removal.
There are alternative explanations for the increase in federal appeals. First, as
the BIA became more efficient at deciding cases, it also grew less likely to rule
in favor of noncitizens. According to a Government Accountability Office
report, "BIA decisions favoring the alien were almost 50 percent lower
(declining from 21 percent to 10 percent) in the 4 2 years following the 2002
streamlining compared with the 4 12 years preceding it." 66 Consequently, there
were simply more BIA decisions to appeal after 2002, and immigrants and their
advocates had more reason to doubt that the BIA provided them a fair
opportunity. These factors naturally led to more petitions for review in the
federal courts.
Another possible explanation for the increase in appeals is that the BIA's new
"affirmance without opinion" procedure left noncitizens feeling as though the
Agency did not properly review their cases, which may have led them to seek
review from the federal courts more often. The BIA used its authority to affirm
without opinion 44% of the asylum cases it reviewed between March 2002 and
October 2006, and entered final orders of removal in 77% of those cases. 67 Thus,
more cases were ripe for appeal after 2002, more BIA decisions ended
unfavorably for noncitizens, and petitioners had concrete procedural reasons to
believe that they had been denied a fair and meaningful review of their cases. 68
63. Marouf, Kagan & Gill, supra note 5, at 368.
64. Id. at 370 (noting that pro se petitioners request stays at a rate comparable to represented
petitioners).
65. Id. at 370-71.
66. GAO REPORT, supra note 21, at 10.
67. Id.
68. In addition, the 2002 procedural reforms led to numerous federal court challenges about
the process itself, raising novel legal issues about the validity of the rulemaking and the legality of
affirmances without opinion. See Lenni B. Benson, Making Paper Dolls: How Restrictions on
Judicial Review and the Administrative Process Increase Immigration Cases in the Federal Courts,
51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 37, 46-47 (2007); see also Dorsey & Whitney, LLP, Study Conducted
for: The American Bar Association Commission on Immigration Policy, Practice and Pro Bono
Re: Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management 31-37 (July
22, 2003), available at http://www.dorsey.com/files/Publication/e649960f-30c0-408f-8965-0df60
4f69523/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/690ecO2a-94b9-4115-alaO-5dl4cf0d7a6d/Dorsey
StudyABA_8mgPDF.pdf.
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C. Stays as an Incentive to Appeal
In Nken, the government argued that both the Ninth and Seventh Circuits
granted stays too leniently. 69  In his concurring opinion, Justice
Kennedy-joined by Justice Scalia-sympathized with the government's
concerns that the Ninth Circuit may be too lenient. 70 Although the government
did not offer any data to support its allegation about the Seventh Circuit, it
claimed that noncitizens in the Ninth Circuit appeal BIA decisions 42% of the
time, while noncitizens in the Eleventh Circuit appeal in only 9% of cases.
The government hypothesized that the availability of a temporary automatic stay
in the Ninth Circuit incentivized appeals in that jurisdiction, whereas the
Eleventh Circuit's comparatively restrictive approach to granting stays
discouraged abusive appeals.72
The government's theory is difficult to test because only limited data is
available about the actual rates of immigration appeals in various circuits. The
most recent study that examined rates of immigration appeals, performed by
John R. B. Palmer, Stephen W. Yale-Loehr, and Elizabeth Cronin, used data
from 2004.73 This study showed that the appeal rates ranged from 9% in the
Eleventh Circuit to 60% in the Eighth Circuit, with an average rate of 34% across
all circuits.74
69. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 39, at 36, 47-48. Our data, which only included
cases decided after Nken, showed that the Seventh Circuit actually granted a modest 31% of stay
requests. Marouf, Kagan & Gill, supra note 5, at 364-65. While it is possible that the Seventh
Circuit changed its practice substantially after the decision, we think this is unlikely because the
court retained its sliding scale approach and a "low" threshold for the likelihood of success. Id.
70. See Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1763 (2009) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
71. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 39, at 36.
72. Id. at 36. Under the Ninth Circuit's General Order 6.4(c), which was issued in 2002, the
petitioner receives a temporary automatic stay upon filing the motion for stay. If the government
fails to respond to the motion or files a notice of non-opposition, then the temporary stay continues
during the pendency of the appeal. If the government opposes the stay, then the court rules on the
motion. The Court does not set a briefing schedule in the case until the motion for stay is resolved,
thereby delaying the litigation. 9TH CIR. GEN. ORDER 6.4(c).
73. Palmer et al., supra note 53.
74. Id. at 54. Because our study reports averages of all of the circuits but not the national
total average, we have computed the same figure based on the Palmer et al. study's data.
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FIGURE 2: RATES OF APPEAL OF BIA DECISIONS TO THE FEDERAL COURTS IN
2004 (PALMER, YALE-LOEHR & CRONIN) 75
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11th Cir. 9%
Our dataset, which begins with cases decided in 2009, did not allow us to
calculate rates of appeal because we examined only appellate courts' dockets
and therefore could not calculate what percentage of BIA orders were
appealed.76 However, we compared the rates of appeal calculated by Palmer
and his colleagues with the rates of stay grants in a previous study, and there
does not appear to be a connection. While the Eleventh Circuit is a low extreme
for both variables, the Eighth Circuit had a high rate of appeal but a lower rate
of stay requests and stay grants. The Seventh Circuit grants stays at a high rate,
but has a low rate of appeal and a relatively low rate of stay requests. In the
Second and Ninth Circuits, which offer some type of temporary automatic stay,
we found that nearly all petitioners requested stays, but the rates of appeal
Palmer and his colleagues reported were only moderately higher than in most
other circuits. These disparities suggest a need for further research and
indicate that noncitizens file federal court appeals in immigration cases for
different and complicated reasons.
75. Id.
76. The Executive Office of Immigration Review reports the number of appeals received by
the BIA, but does not report the number of removal orders issued. See FY 2011 STATISTICAL
YEARBOOK, supra note 58, at S1. Because a noncitizen would only appeal an order of removal,
without this data it is difficult to determine if current figures are similar with those in 2004.
77. Palmer, Yale-Loehr & Cronin, supra note 74, at 54 (reporting that the Second and Ninth
Circuits were among five circuits with appeal rates over 30% but under 50%).
78. Previous research that explored the reasons for the variations among the circuits in the
rates of immigration appeals has been inconclusive. Id. at 71-80.
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There are many possible reasons why the Ninth Circuit has an especially high
appeal rate. The Ninth Circuit's body of immigration case law may be perceived
as more favorable to noncitizens than the case law of other circuits, which may
encourage noncitizens to file appeals in the Ninth Circuit rather than in other
courts. Another possible explanation relates to localized differences in the
immigration bar in different metropolitan areas. Immigration lawyers may not
behave the same way in all regions, and differences among a relatively small
number of practitioners can have a substantial impact on the number of cases
filed.79 Furthermore, some lawyers change their behavior in response to
particular events, such as BIA streamlining.80 The Ninth Circuit has seventeen
immigration courts, but the courts in Los Angeles and San Francisco handled
approximately 38% of the removal proceedings in the Circuit in 2011.81 This
means that if the immigration lawyers in these two cities are especially
aggressive in filing appeals, the appeal rate for the Circuit could appear
significantly higher, even if cases in the other fifteen courts followed the national
average. 82
Until now, the theory that immigrants file appeals just to buy time has been
fertile ground for speculation because it was easy to assume that the federal court
process takes a long time. However, our empirical data show that an appeal to
a federal court may be the fastest part of the immigration adjudication system,
and that federal courts often resolve weak cases quickly. Our findings belie
concerns that federal courts are vulnerable to systemic abuse, or at least indicate
that if frivolous appeals are being filed, they are likely delaying deportation by
only a few months.
II. EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE DURATION OF APPEALS
A. Methodology
Our study analyzed 1646 immigration cases throughout the eleven circuits
that handle immigration appeals. We found these cases through the Public
Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) service, which provides on-line
access to federal court records. Because orders on stays are interim decisions,
we could only access them by looking into individual case dockets in PACER;
such interim decisions generally are not available through Westlaw or Lexis.
PACER also helped us create a superior sample because it includes all
immigration cases, whereas Westlaw and Lexis select which cases to include in
their databases.
79. Id. at 89 (noting that a small group of lawyers can account for the majority of immigration
petitions in a single circuit).
80. Id. at 88.
81. FY 2011 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note 58, at B6.
82. Id.
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Importantly, our datasets 83 included not only cases decided on the merits, but
also cases dismissed for lack of jurisdiction or for procedural reasons, such as
failure to file a brief or pay the required fees, or cases voluntarily dismissed by
the petitioner. We included data of such dismissals so that we could compare
the duration of cases decided on the merits with the duration of cases dismissed
for other reasons. This data is critical to calculating the amount of delay that
results from the filing of potentially frivolous or abusive appeals. Our data thus
provide a more complete picture of the circuit courts' immigration dockets than
other studies that examine only cases decided on the merits. 84
We calculated the duration of an appeal by using the date that the case was
opened ("docketed") in PACER (the date that the petition for review was filed),
and the date that the case was closed ("termed") in PACER (the date that the
judgment was entered or the petition dismissed).85 In addition to recording the
dates necessary to measure duration, we recorded other variables visible on the
83. We used two overlapping datasets for the analyses in this Article. The first dataset is a
random sample of 100 immigration appeals in each circuit that were filed after April 22, 2009,
when the Supreme Court decided Nken, and that have been resolved by the courts. We also
collected a supplemental dataset of cases in which the petitioner requested a stay of removal. We
collected enough additional cases such that we ended up with approximately one hundred cases per
circuit in which a stay was requested. In some circuits with relatively small numbers of immigration
appeals, we could not find one hundred cases in which stays had been requested and where a final
decision had been made on the petition for review between the date that Nken was issued and the
present. We used the first random sample of one hundred cases to analyze stay request rates, or
other empirical questions that required us to distinguish between cases with and without stay
requests. We used the supplemental sample of one hundred cases per circuit with stay requests to
analyze whether stays are granted.
84. Cf Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Philip J. Schrag, Refugee Roulette:
Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REv. 295, 405 (2007) (choosing to include only
cases decided on the merits).
85. The closing dates recorded in PACER do not include the additional period of time for a
mandate to issue, although the date that the mandate issued is apparent from the docket. The
mandate provides official notice of the court's decision to the BIA; it is not a judgment. Because
the court retains control of the case until the mandate is issued, it may not be clear why we did not
go by the date that the mandate was issued to measure the duration of an appeal. The reason is that
the date of the mandate depends on whether post-judgment filings are made.
Under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, if one of the parties is a United States
officer sued in an official capacity-which is the case in immigration appeals since the respondent
is always the Attorney General-a petition for rehearing may be filed within forty-five days after
entry of the judgment. FED. R. APP. P. 40(a)(1). This time can be shortened or extended by local
court rules. Id. If neither party seeks rehearing, then the mandate must issue seven days after the
period for seeking rehearing expires. FED. R. App. P. 41(b). A party may also move to stay the
mandate for ninety days pending the filing of a petition for writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court.
If the petition for the writ is actually filed, then the stay continues until the Supreme Court's final
disposition. Using the date that the mandate is issued as the "end" date of the appeal would
therefore greatly distort the amount of time that it actually takes the court to resolve the appeal.
Moreover, local rules governing the time period for requesting rehearing would affect our
comparison of how long it takes different circuit courts to decide immigration appeals. We
therefore used the date that the judgment was entered, which is consistent with how PACER records
the end of an appeal.
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PACER dockets that we suspected could have an impact on duration. These
included: whether a stay was requested; whether the government opposed the
stay; whether the court granted the stay; whether the petitioner was represented
or pro se; whether the petitioner filed a request to proceed in forma pauperis;
the type of case; whether the case was scheduled for oral argument; the political
composition and size of the panels that ruled on the stay and the petition for
review; and how the case was resolved-whether it was decided on the merits
or dismissed for other reasons, namely lack of jurisdiction, procedural flaws, or
voluntarily. We used these variables to develop a linear regression model for
the duration of immigration appeals, which shows the change in duration
predicted by a given factor.
B. Average Duration of Immigration Appeals
Across the circuits, we found that immigration appeals took an average of 8.8
months. 86  Previous studies suggested an average duration of one year for
immigration petitions in the circuit courts.87  One explanation for this
discrepancy is the omission of non-merits dismissals in studies that relied on
databases like Westlaw and Lexis; we were able to capture such dismissals by
using the PACER dockets. Our findings show that only the Second and Sixth
Circuits took an average one year or longer to adjudicate immigration appeals.
Several circuits took only seven months. These results demonstrate that, for
most circuits, common perceptions of the duration of immigration appeals are
wrong. The average duration of immigration appeals in each circuit is presented
in Figure 3 below.
86. This number is the average of all the circuits. It is not a national average because far more
immigration appeals are concentrated in some circuits (for example, the Ninth and Second) than in
others.
87. Palmer et al., supra note 53, at 82-85 (reporting data for the Second, Ninth, and Eleventh
circuits).
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FIGURE 3: AVERAGE DURATION OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS BY CIRCUIT
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C. Factors That Affect the Duration of an Appeal
Although averages provide useful information, they mask huge variations in
the duration of individual appeals. Some of the appeals in our sample lasted as
little as a few weeks while others took two years. Various factors affect the
length of an appeal. 88 Not surprisingly, we found that if an appeal is scheduled
for oral argument, it takes approximately three months longer. 89 These cases are
the least likely to be frivolous because courts usually schedule oral argument
only for particularly challenging cases and those that raise important legal issues.
Asylum cases take an average of one month longer, perhaps because they tend
to involve legally and factually complex issues.90 Pro se cases are resolved
88. See Appendix A, infra, for the linear regression model predicting the duration of cases,
in months.
89. See infra Appendix A. While the delay caused by oral argument is relatively long, only
a small percentage of the cases in our sample (9%) actually included oral argument, indicating that
this factor does not affect the vast majority of appeals. Courts also exert significant control over
whether to schedule cases for oral argument. For example, the Second Circuit does not schedule
any immigration appeals for oral argument in order to process them more quickly. See Erick
Rivero, Note, Asylumn and Oral Argument: The Judiciary in Immigration and the Second Circuit
Non-Argumnent Calendar, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1497, 1521 (2006) (arguing that the non-argument
calendar violates due process). Despite these efforts, the Second Circuit remains the slowest circuit.
90. See infra Appendix A.
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almost two months faster than those with attorneys, possibly due to the
difficulties pro se petitioners face in articulating a substantive appeal. 91
Most relevant to concerns about frivolousness is our finding that how the
appeal is resolved-whether it is decided on the merits or dismissed for
jurisdictional or procedural grounds-significantly affects duration. Non-merits
dismissals take almost three months less. As shown in Figure 4 below, in most
circuits, non-merits dismissals occur within just five to six months.
FIGURE 4: DURATION OF PETITIONS (IN MONTHS) BASED ON How THEY ARE
RESOLVED
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Generally the weakest cases-those with jurisdictional or procedural flaws
that appear most frivolous on their face-are resolved much more quickly than
the average appeal. We also note that some circuits act more quickly to deny
petitions on the merits than to grant them. The First Circuit takes an average of
sixteen months to grant petitions, but just nine months to deny them on the
merits. Similarly, the Second Circuit takes seventeen months to grant and
fourteen months to deny a petition on the merits. These differences are
consistent with the theory that it is easier-and therefore faster-for a court to
affirm an agency decision than to vacate it.92 Interestingly, we did not observe
91. See infra Appendix A.
92. See Thomas J. Miles, The Law's Delay: A Test of the Mechanisms of Judicial Peer Effects,
4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 301, 318 (2012) (indicating that courts tend to resolve cases faster when
validating an agency decision than when reversing it). The theory is that "[w]hen a court defers
and validates an agency decision ... its task is a less searching and demanding inquiry than when
it declines to defer and fully engages int n o the agency's decision." Id. at 317.
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this pattern in most circuits, in which grants and denials on the merits took
roughly the same amount of time. In fact, when we combined the data from all
circuits, we found no statistically significant difference in the duration of appeals
granted and denied on the merits. 93 These results suggest that all courts may
actually defer to the BIA's decisions, or that giving deference simply does not
consistently speed up the adjudication for immigration cases. 94  The Sixth
Circuit actually took longer to deny a case on the merits than to grant it, which
may reflect an emphasis on avoiding errant deportations.
We found no evidence to validate the government's concern that filing or
adjudicating a stay drags out an appeal. 95 Neither filing a motion for a stay, nor
government opposition to the motion, nor the granting of a stay is associated
with a significant increase in the duration of the case. However, if we limit our
sample only to appeals decided on the merits, our analysis shows that cases
where stays were requested took an average of 1.65 months longer, which is
statistically significant. 96 Government opposition to the motion or the granting
of a stay did not increase the duration of appeals decided on the merits. Thus,
for the subset of appeals decided on the merits, which already eliminates those
most likely to be frivolous, the request for a stay is associated with only a small
increase in the duration of the appeal. Requesting a stay in a case that satisfies
jurisdictional and procedural requirements may heighten the care that judges
take in resolving the case. However, have no basis for determining with
certainty the explanation for these phenomena.
D. Disparities Among the Circuits in Closing Appeals Quickly
Analyzing only averages obscures the fact that many circuit courts are adept
at closing significant numbers of immigration cases in a very short amount of
time. Most circuits close at least 30% of immigration appeals in less than six
months. We also found that it is common for courts to be able to close 10% to
20% of their immigration cases in less than three months.
93. See infra Appendix B.
94. Our results are consistent with other empirical research that casts doubt on whether
deferential standards of review actually have an impact on the results of administrative law cases.
As one recent review of the research summarized, "[t]here is no empirical support for the
widespread belief that choice of doctrine plays a major role in judicial review of agency actions."
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do the Studies ofJudicial Review ofAgency Actions Mean?, 63 ADMIN.
L. REv. 77, 93 (2011). In immigration cases specifically, some courts have expressed open
objections to deferring to the BIA because of doubts about its decision-making. See Adam B. Cox,
Deference, Delegation and Immigration Law, 74. U. CHI. L. REv. 1671, 1683-84 (2007) (noting
that Seventh Circuit Judge Posner does not defer to immigration courts); Michael Kagan, Dubious
Deference: Reassessing Appellate Standards ofReview in Immigration Appeals, 5 DREXEL L. REV.
101, 121-23 (2012) (discussing the empirical literature that casts doubt on the impact of deference
on adjudication in the immigration context).
95. See infra Appendix A.
96. See Appendix B, infra, for the linear regression model of the duration of cases decided on
the merits, in months.
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Categorizing cases into six-month bands (cases decided in less than six
months, cases decided in six to twelve months, and so on) reveals that the circuits
resolve immigration appeals in very different patterns. For example, the Ninth
Circuit closes immigration appeals in an average of ten months, while the
Eleventh Circuit's average is just 7.3 months. However, in our sample of one
hundred cases per circuit, the Ninth Circuit closed forty-seven cases in less than
six months, compared to Eleventh Circuit's thirty-six. The Third Circuit was
also slower than the Eleventh Circuit, with a mean duration of 9.3 months for
immigration appeals. Nevertheless, the Third Circuit closed twenty-one out of
one hundred cases in less than three months, compared to the Eleventh Circuit's
five cases. Figure 5 below shows the percentage of cases closed in zero to three
months and in three to six months in each circuit. The Ninth Circuit's ability to
close nearly half of its cases so quickly is remarkable because it receives more
immigration petitions than any other circuit.
FIGURE 5: PERCENTAGE OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS CLOSED IN 0-3 MONTHS
AND 3-6 MONTHS
6)0
(D
0)
C
1 st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10Oth 1 1th
Less than 3 mos. Less than 6 mos.
(cumulative total)
E. The Impact of Duration on Application Rates for Stays of Removal
If immigrant petitioners are motivated by a desire for delay, and if the
potential for delay varies from circuit to circuit, it is plausible that petitioners are
more likely to request a stay of removal in the slower circuits. Our data weakly
supports this hypothesis, although it is admittedly a difficult theory to test.
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Overall, across all circuits, as the stay request rate increases, the average
duration of cases increases. 97 For each additional month of average duration,
the stay request rate increases by 8%.98
The cause of this relationship is difficult to determine. The Second and Ninth
Circuits account for much of the relationship because nearly every petitioner in
those circuits requests a stay. We reported in a separate study that the temporary
stay of removal offered in these circuits is the most plausible explanation for the
nearly 100% stay request rate. 99 We also identified many other factors that
correlate to an increased stay request rate, such as detention rates. It is probable
that stay requests lead to a longer duration rather than vice versa because stay
requests are associated with an increase in the duration of merits-based
decisions.
F. The Impact of Court Procedures on Delay
Part of the reason that the circuits show such different patterns in processing
time for immigration appeals is the different internal procedures that the courts
use to screen out certain types of cases, especially on jurisdictional and
procedural grounds, such as a petitioner's failure to prosecute the appeal. We
were able to document this because the docket reports that we analyzed generally
indicated whether a petition was denied for lack of jurisdiction or for procedural
reasons, which allowed us to separate cases denied for a non-merits reason from
those decided on the merits.
Although all of the circuits tend to issue non-merits denials faster than other
decisions, some circuits take longer to do so than others. In the Eighth Circuit,
fifteen of nineteen cases decided in less than three months were non-merits
dismissals. In the Fifth Circuit, twenty of twenty-three petitions finished in less
than three months were non-merits dismissals. By contrast, in the Sixth Circuit,
twenty-one of twenty-six cases decided in less than eight months were non-
merits dismissals. However, the Sixth Circuit decided just two cases out of our
sample of one hundred in less than three months. Thus, although the circuits
may follow a similar pattern of issuing non-merits dismissals faster than merits-
based decisions, some circuits are particularly fast and may issue a dismissal in
a matter of weeks in some cases and just a few months in many others.
The way in which courts sort cases varies from circuit to circuit. In many
circuits, including the First, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits, staff attorneys process cases recommended for screening and special
panels decide those cases. 00 However, there are some notable differences and
97. See Appendix C, infra, for the bivariate relationship between the stay grant rate and the
average duration of appeals.
98. The bivariate correlation is rho = 0.6845 (p = 0.0202, n=11) when we include all circuits.
99. See Marouf, Kagan & Gill, supra note 5, at 392.
100. See John B. Oakley, The Screening of Appeals: The Ninth Circuit's Experience in the
Eighties and Innovations for the Nineties, 1991 BYU L. REv. 859, 866-67 (1991).
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exceptions. For example, the Third Circuit is unique in sending all cases to
argument panels without any staff input on screening cases for oral argument or
for complexity.10 1  Similarly, standing immigration panels review all of the
immigration cases in the Third Circuit. 102 The Sixth Circuit uses staff attorneys
to screen cases, but then routes screening recommendations to regular arguments
panels that must the cases into their daily calendars. 103 Moreover the Second
and Ninth Circuits manage their immigration dockets differently, which
influences the duration of their cases. Because these two circuits hear most of
the country's immigration appeals, we believe their procedures warrant greater
scrutiny.
1. Efficiency Though Screening: The Ninth Circuit
It is logical to expect courts with relatively small immigration dockets to
complete cases faster than those with large dockets. However, there is a stark
contrast between the Second and Ninth Circuits, which together handle nearly
75% of the immigration appeals nationwide. The Ninth Circuit alone handled
47% of all the BIA appeals filed nationally in 2011.104 While the Ninth Circuit
closes nearly half of its immigration petitions in less than six months, the Second
Circuit closes relatively few cases so quickly. Figure 6 below portrays the
different patterns of adjudication in these two courts.
101. See id. at 867; Marin K. Levy, The Mechanics of Federal Appeals: Uniformity and Case
Management in the Circuit Courts, 61 DUKE L.J. 315, 337 (2011).
102. See Levy, supra note 101, at 338.
103. See Oakley, supra note 100, at 867.
104. NINTH CIRCUIT ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 60, at 58.
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FIGURE 6: PATTERNS OF ADJUDICATION IN THE SECOND AND NINTH CIRCUITS
C)
C)
C5
C) c
a)
a)C)
<6 mos. 6-12 mos. 12-18 mos. 18-24 mos. > 24 mos.
2nd Circuit 9th Circuit
If we define speed by the percentage of cases closed in less than six months,
the Ninth Circuit is the second fastest in the country and the Second Circuit is
the second slowest. The Ninth Circuit closes some cases in less than three
months, while the Second Circuit almost never closes a case that quickly.
Similarly, while the plurality of immigration appeals in the Second Circuit drag
on for more than a year, the Ninth Circuit typically closes comparable cases in
less than half of a year, and, in a significant number of cases, in just a few weeks.
When a noncitizen files a motion for stay of removal in the Ninth
Circuit-usually at the same time as the petition for review-the court promptly
sets dates by which the government must file the certified administrative record
and respond to the motion. 105 Any dispositive motions, such as motions to
dismiss, are due at the same time as the response to the motion for stay, which
is eighty-four days from the filing of the original motion. 106 These deadlines are
strictly enforced.10 7 We observed that the Ninth Circuit also uses Orders to
Show Cause (OSCs) fairly aggressively to weed out appeals for which
jurisdiction is questionable, or for procedural reasons such as failure to pay the
105. 9THCIR. GEN. ORDER 6.4(c)(3).
106. Id.
107. Id. (stating that the court will not entertain any motions for an extension of time to respond
to the motion if the certified administrative record is filed in accordance with the schedule).
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filing fee. 108 If the petitioner fails to provide a satisfactory response, the staff
attorney can set the case for consideration by a "motions and screening panel"
of judges, which usually results in expeditious dismissal of the case, sometimes
even before the government's deadline for responding to the stay motion. 109
The Ninth Circuit also increases its efficiency through a case weighting
system. Staff attorneys designate certain cases to be resolved under well-settled
law as "screening cases."110 The court assigns a "case weight" to each appeal
based on its perceived degree of difficulty to more evenly allocate the time-
consuming cases so that the most complex cases are not all assigned to the same
judges."' As Professor Anna 0. Law explained:
This weighting system also dictates how the cases are calendared and
whether the cases are placed on an oral argument track or on a
screening track. The former, which may not literally mean that
counsel will engage in oral argument before the judges, nevertheless
means that the appeal will receive more attention from judges rather
than staff. The latter means that an appeal will receive less judicial
scrutiny and is characterized by heavy staff involvement. . . . The
screening track . . . is meant for appeals that are regarded as
straightforward and therefore easy, or appeals that are perceived as
frivolous or hopeless. 112
Although the Ninth Circuit began developing this system in the late 1970s and
early 1980s and did not design it specifically for immigration cases, it is helpful
in this area because of the large volume of appeals. 113 The Ninth Circuit's "Pro
Se Unit" is another factor in its efficient disposition of immigration cases.
Created in 1992 as a response to a dramatic increase in pro se cases, this unit,
comprised of one staff attorney and several paralegals, processes all pro se
appeals in civil and habeas corpus cases. 114 If the unit believes that an appeal is
frivolous or has a flaw that requires dismissal, it immediately prepares an order
for the Motions and Screening Panel to review.115
108. See id. 6.4(c)(5) (discussing Orders to Show Cause); see also Honorable J. Clifford
Wallace, Improving the Appellate Process Worldwide Through Maximizing Judicial Resources, 38
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'LL. 187, 192-93 (2005) (explaining that staff attorneys in the Ninth Circuit's
"Motions Unit" are responsible for reviewing every appeal filed and issue Orders to Show Cause
directing the party to explain how the court has jurisdiction).
109. See Wallace, supra note 108, at 193. The motions and screening panel dedicates one
week each month to decide all pending motions and screening cases to determine which require
oral argument. Id. at 198-99.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 196-97.
112. ANNA 0. LAW, THE IMMIGRATION BATTLE IN AMERICAN COURTS 160 (2010).
113. Id. at 158-59.
114. Cathy A. Catterson, The Role of the Staff in the Operation of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 389, 391 (2000); Wallace, supra note 108, at 194.
115. Wallace, supra note 108, at 194. The Pro Se Unit also monitors cases for inactivity to
determine whether dismissal is required based on failure to prosecute. Id. at 195. In addition, the
704 [Vol. 63:679
2014] Buying Time? False Assumptions About Abusive Appeals
The Ninth Circuit's system has clear efficiency benefits, but it also generates
significant concerns. After 2002, the majority of immigration appeals were
routed for screening panels, including all pro se cases. 116 As a consequence,
these cases are far more likely to eventually be rejected. In 2001, 31% of pro se
applications for asylum were successful in the Ninth Circuit.1 17 By 2005, the
success rate had dropped to 5%.118
A critical but somewhat invisible part of the case screening system is the
courts' heavy reliance on staff attorneys rather than judges to direct the flow of
cases and to determine what kind of judicial attention each case receives.
Professor Law concluded that in the Ninth Circuit the staff suffered the ultimate
burden of the heavy caseload, not the judges. 119 In anonymous interviews with
Ninth Circuit judges, she found considerable ambivalence about the system and
reported complaints that judges have inadequate time to evaluate cases and a
sense of resignation that the court has no alternative. 120
2. An Alternative Perspective: The Second Circuit
The Second Circuit, which has the second-largest immigration docket, took
the longest to adjudicate immigration appeals. In many ways, this Circuit is an
innovator in the handling of its immigration docket, but its procedures result in
a very long timeline for resolution of petitions. This longer timeline, coupled
with an informal provision for temporary automatic stays, leaves the Second
Circuit the most vulnerable to abuse of the appellate process. At the same time,
the Circuit has developed an alternative perspective on immigration appeals that
merits serious consideration.
The Second Circuit was forced to radically reform its traditional practice of
holding oral arguments in the majority of cases because of the surge of
immigration appeals after the BIA reforms of 2002.121 In 2005, the Second
Circuit implemented a new local rule that created a Non-Argument Calendar
(NAC) for appeals challenging the denial of asylum and related relief, provided
unit tracks "frequent flyers" who may be abusing the system, such as a petitioner appealing the
denial of a third or fourth motion to reopen. Id. at 194-95. Lastly, the unit identifies cases that
would merit from the appointment of pro bono attorneys. Id. at 195.
116. LAW, supra note 112, at 165.
117. Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 84, at 360.
118. Id. at 360.
119. LAW, supra note 112, at 157.
120. Id. at 167-68.
121. Oakley, supra note 100, at 863-64 (describing how, at the time, the Second Circuit
"limit[ed] dispositions without oral argument to the bare minimum required by circumstances
independent of court control," such as cases involving pro se incarcerated litigants in which both
parties waive appeal and the presiding judge on the panel agrees); see also Stacy Caplow, After the
Flood: The Legacy of the "Surge" of Federal Immigration Appeals, 7 Nw. J. L. & SOC. POL'Y 1, 9
(2012); Wilfred Feinberg, Unique Customs and Practices of the Second Circuit, 14 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 297, 307 (1986) (noting that "every circuit but the Second utilizes some sort of screening
procedure to identify appeals on which argument will not be heard").
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that the cases are not scheduled for oral argument unless specifically ordered by
the court. 122 The court also created an Immigration Unit in the Staff Attorney's
Office with approximately twelve staff attorneys who prepare bench memoranda
on petitions for review to assist the NAC. 123  When it is time to vote on
immigration cases, the judges use a "round robin" method with no
deliberation. 124 Due largely to these new procedures in immigration cases, the
number of unpublished summary orders the court issued doubled between 2002
and 2008.125 Nonetheless, these changes do not seem to have increased the
speed at which the circuit closes its immigration cases relative to other courts.
In October 2012, the Second Circuit implemented a completely new
procedure for handling immigration cases. 126 The court based its new system
on the Obama administration's policy of granting prosecutors the discretion to
prioritize removal cases. The new executive branch policy instructs ICE to not
use its limited resources to deport "low-priority" individuals and provides a list
of factors to use in deciding who is and is not a high priority. 127 Consequently,
the Second Circuit now tolls all immigration petitions for ninety days, holding
off on the usual briefing schedule to give the parties time to try to reach an
agreement about whether the case should be remanded for administrative closure
under the prosecutorial discretion policy. 128 Either party may end the tolling
early. 129 Absent a request to end the tolling, the court will presume that the
informal stay of removal will continue. 130
The Second Circuit's new process is striking because it indicates that the court
sees little harm in extending the timeline of an appeal and significantly delaying
deportation in the process. Already slow in comparison to other circuits, the
Second Circuit has now added up to three months to its average resolution time
122. 2D CIR. R. 34.2(c); see Caplow, supra note 121, at 9; Elizabeth Cronin, When the Deluge
Hits and You Never Saw the Storm: Asylum Overload and the Second Circuit, 59 ADMIN. L. REV.
547, 554 (2007); John R.B. Palmer, The Second Circuit's "New Asylum Seekers": Responses to an
Expanded Immigration Docket, 55 CATH. U. L. REv. 965, 975 (2006); Rivero, supra note 89, at
1521.
123. See Caplow, supra note 121, at 10.
124. See Levy, supra note 101, at 350.
125. See Caplow, supra note 121, at 10-11. The Second Circuit issued summary orders in 147
of the 150 immigration-related cases decided in June 2009 (99.1%), and all but five of these
summary orders denied or dismissed the petition for review, an affirmance rate of 96.6%. This is
nearly identical to the affirmance rate of 97% in our sample.
126. This procedure was not in place for the cases sampled in our research.
127. Matter of Immigration Petitions for Review Pending in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, 702 F.3d 160, 161 (2d Cir. 2012); see also Memorandum from John Morton,
Director, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, to All Field Office Directors, All Special
Agents in Charge, All Chief Counsel 4 (June 17, 2011) [hereinafter Morton Memorandum],
available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.
pdf.
128. Matter of Immigration Petitions, 702 F.3d at 161.
129. Id. at 162.
130. Id.
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of immigration cases, while at the same time expecting the forbearance against
removal to continue during that time.
The Second Circuit has effectively turned the tables on the government in the
debate over frivolous appeals. The court's order fails to acknowledge the
government's concern about frustrating immigration enforcement or the
possibility that immigrants abuse the appellate process. Instead, the Second
Circuit faults the government for pursuing too many removal orders, and
complains that in many cases in which it upholds a removal order, the
government fails to execute the deportation. 131 The court explained that "it is
wasteful to commit judicial resources to immigration cases when circumstances
suggest that, if the Government prevails, it is unlikely to promptly effect the
petitioner's removal."1 32  The Second Circuit thus has a very different
understanding of the problem than the Nken Court, which expressed worry about
noncitizens' abuse of the appellate process. The Second Circuit's insight that
both sides may have a tendency to over-litigate is an essential piece of context
to consider.
G. Efficiency Versus Accuracy
One of our clearest findings is that courts' sorting and decision procedures can
have a significant impact on the duration of their cases. However, changing
these procedures may also affect the quality of decision-making, especially if
speed depends on limiting the ability of the parties to develop arguments and
curtailing the time for judges to deliberate. Appellate courts should have a clear
understanding of these potential tradeoffs. As the Supreme Court stated in Nken,
the goal of having a stay system is to avoid the need to administer "justice on
the fly."1 33 Several procedures designed to promote efficiency may affect a
court's accuracy in identifying the cases that deserve a stay. Because our prior
research reveals high rates of false negative and false positive decisions on stays
and the government's main objection to stays centers on delay, we are especially
interested in how particular procedures may involve tradeoffs between speed
and accuracy.
We focus on four procedural factors that may influence both the duration and
accuracy of rulings on stay motions: (1) the number of judges that decide the
motion for stay (ranging from zero-a decision rendered by a clerk-to three);
(2) the amount of explanation provided in the decision; (3) the level of reliance
on staff attorneys; and (4) the manner of voting. There is good reason to believe
that reducing the number of decision-makers and dispensing with explanations
increases the speed of adjudication. After all, the BIA adopted these very
procedures after streamlining and began processing appeals in one third of the
131. See id. at 160.
132. See id.
133. Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1757 (2009).
707
Catholic University Law Review
amount of time that it previously needed. 134 The number of decision-makers
who rule on the stay and the amount of explanation in the decision are both
variables that we could observe from PACER cases, so we are able to include
some quantitative information in our discussion of these factors. The analysis
of the third and fourth factors is more qualitative in nature.
1. Panel Size
The three-judge panel system for adjudicating appeals is designed to reduce
error and promote better decisions; the interaction among judges forces them to
justify their reasoning, helps reduce the influence of ideology and individual
subjectivity, draws attention to important issues that individual judges may have
initially overlooked, and leads judges to refine or even change their views. 135
Indeed, through the process of deliberation, judges "often come to see things
they did not at first see and to be convinced of views they did not at first
espouse."1 36 A single judge acting alone does not have the benefit of these
"checks" on his or her reasoning.137 At the same time, involving multiple judges
in the decision-making process may increase the amount of time necessary to
reach a decision on the stay or lengthen the overall duration of the appeal,
especially if other steps, such as issuing a briefing schedule, are put on hold until
134. GAO REPORT, supra note 21, at 50 & fig.8.
135. See Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of
Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 42 (1994) (explaining that if each judge has a
50% chance of arriving at the "correct" answer, then the larger the panel, the more likely it will
collectively arrive at the right result); Dan T. Coenen, To Defer or Not to Defer: A Study of Federal
Circuit Court Deference to District Court Rulings on State Law, 73 MINN. L. REV. 899, 924 (1989)
("Assigning several judges to a problem reduces the risk that important lines of analysis will escape
attention."); Joshua A. Douglas, The Procedure of Election Law in Federal Courts, 2011 UTAH L.
REV. 433, 462-63 (2011) ("[U]sing multiple judges decreases the possibility that ideology will
drive the decision because multiple judges temper the ideological bent a single judge may bring to
a case, assuming the panel includes judges of varied viewpoints"); Harry T. Edwards, The Effects
of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639, 1660 (2003) (describing
"the give and take of collegial deliberation, during which a judge's approach to a case must
withstand careful scrutiny and criticism from his or her colleagues" and observing that this
interaction often leads judges to shift their initial views on the case); Feinberg, supra note 121, at
300 (exploring how a persuasive memo by one member of a panel often has the power to change
the votes of one or both of the other judges on the panel); Joy Milligan, Note, Pluralism in America:
Why Judicial Diversity Improves Legal Decisions About Political Morality, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1206, 1234 (2006) (discussing research demonstrating that "judges within panels may learn from
one another's ideas and worldviews").
136. Edwards, supra note 135, at 1660-61.
137. For example, after the streamlining of the BIA's procedures, single members of the BIA
made many decisions that three-member panels previously made. Three-member panel decisions
made during fiscal years 2004 through 2006 favored the noncitizen in 52% of cases, whereas single-
member decisions made during the same time period favored the noncitizen in only 7% of cases.
See GAO REPORT, supra note 21, at 10. As of 2009, over 90% of BIA decisions were single-
member decisions. See Maria Baldini-Potermin, Practice Before the Board of Immigration
Appeals: Recent Roundtable and Additional Practice Tips, 86 INTERPRETER RELEASES 2009, 2010
(2009).
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the court makes a decision on the stay. Thus, the size of the panel that rules on
the stay may involve a tradeoff between speed and accuracy.
Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 18(a)(2)(D), a motion for a stay
pending review of an agency's decision "normally will be considered by a panel
of the court," but may be considered by a single judge "in an exceptional case in
which time requirements make that procedure impracticable."1 38 The local rules
and internal operating procedures of several circuits stress the presumption that
a panel of judges will adjudicate the motion. 139 In our sample, three-judge
panels decided the majority of stay motions (58.6%). 140 Two-judge panels
decided an additional 15.7% of cases, while decisions by a single judge were
extremely uncommon, comprising only 1% of cases. 141 Surprisingly, clerks
decided nearly one quarter of the motions (24.7%), without any judge's name
on the decision. Figure 7 below shows the percentage of cases in each circuit
decided by clerks, one judge, two judges, and three judges.
138. FED. R. APP. P. 18(a)(2)(D).
139. See, e.g., 4TH CIR. R. 27(e) ("There is a strong presumption that the Court will act, in all
but routine procedural matters, through panels or en banc.... Application to a single judge should
be made only in exceptional circumstances where action by a panel would be impractical due to
the requirements of time."); 6TH CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING P. 27(a)(1) ("In cases not yet assigned
to a merits panel, substantive motions are assigned to randomly assembled panels."); 10TH CIR. R.
8.3(A) (stating that "Application[s] to a single judge ... [are] disfavored except in an emergency.");
10TH CIR. R. 18 ("Applications for stay[s] must comply with Rule 8.").
140. Three-judge panels decided 638 out of 1085 stay motions.
141. Two-judge panels decided 170 out of 1085 stay motions. Eleven were decided by a single
judge.
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FIGURE 7: PANEL SIZE DECIDING MOTIONS FOR STAYS BY CIRCUIT
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Three-judge panels decided over 90% of the stay motions in the Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, and Seventh Circuits. They also decided the vast majority of stay motions
in the First Circuit (71%), Second Circuit (77%), and Eighth Circuit (84%). In
the remaining circuits, the percentage of three-judge decisions was significantly
lower: 37% of decisions in the Third Circuit, 15% of decisions in the Eighth
Circuit, 4% of decisions in the Ninth Circuit, and 4% of decisions in the Tenth
Circuit. Two-judge panels issued a significant percentage of the decisions on
stays in Ninth (29%), Third (53%), and Tenth (88%) circuits. 142  In the
remaining circuits, two-judge panels issued decisions in between 0% and 3% of
cases. The circuits with the highest percentages of decisions by clerks are the
First (28%), Ninth (67%), and Eighth (85%) Circuits. In the Ninth Circuit, 41%
of the decisions by clerks involved cases in which the government did not file
an opposition to the stay motion, which automatically results in a grant under
the court's General Order 6.4(c). 143 In the Eighth Circuit, in which clerks decide
142. The Ninth Circuit rules provide that substantive motions that do not dispose of the appeal,
such as motions for stays, are presented to two judges. If the two judges are in agreement, they
ordinarily decide the motion. A third judge participates only if the other two judges disagree or
request the participation of the third judge, or if one of them is disqualified or unavailable. See 9th
Cir. Advisory Committee Note to R. 27-1(3)(c); see also 9TH CIR. GEN. ORDER 6.3(g)(1)(iii).
Three-judge panels did not decide any of the Ninth Circuit stay motions in our sample.
143. 9THCIR. GEN. ORDER 6.4(c)(6).
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most stay motions, the local rules actually suggest that three-judge panels should
make these decisions. 144
There does not appear to be any statistically significant relationship between
the size of the panel that rules on the stay motion and the duration of the
appeal. 145 The Tenth Circuit, which relies heavily on two-judge panels, and the
Eighth Circuit, which relies heavily on clerks, did not process appeals more
quickly than the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, which rely primarily on three judge
panels. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit, which relies on both clerks and two-judge
panels, took an average of one to two months longer to render a decision than
several circuits that only use three-judge panels. This suggests that reducing the
size of the panel that rules on the stay does not increase efficiency in adjudicating
the appeal.
Our results also do not suggest a clear relationship between panel size and
accuracy. In the Third Circuit, which relies heavily on two-judge panels for stay
motions, we found a statistically significant association between a granted stay
motion and an ultimately successful appeal. 146 In fact, the Third Circuit was our
most "accurate" circuit, with no false negatives and a low rate of false
positives. 14 Yet, in the Tenth Circuit, which also relies primarily on two-judge
panels, we found a statistically significant association between a denied stay and
an ultimately successful appeal, making it one of the least "accurate" circuits. 148
The Ninth Circuit, which also frequently uses two-judge panels, falls somewhere
in the middle in terms of accuracy, granting stays to about half of the petitioners
who ultimately prevailed. 149 Thus, use of a two-judge panel itself does not seem
to have a significant impact on accuracy.
Given the constraints on the judiciary's time and resources and the need to
make decisions on stay requests relatively quickly, it is understandable that
courts sometimes-or typically-permit two rather than three judges to make
these decisions. 150 However, we recognize that allowing clerks to rule on stay
motions can be problematic. In the absence of a procedural rule that dictates a
particular result, the use of clerks is inconsistent with Rule 18(a)(2)(D).
144. 8TH CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING P. (I)(D)(3). The fact that the vast majority of stay
motions in the Eighth Circuit are decided by clerks is particularly odd because the court's local
rules provide that administrative panels consisting of three judges are supposed to rule on stays
pending appeal. See id.
145. We calculated a correlation of .06. If we removed the decisions by clerks from the
analysis, the correlation is -.05, which also is not significant.
146. See Marouf, Kagan & Gill, supra note 5, at 381-83.
147. See id.
148. See id. at 384.
149. See id.
150. Other countries, such as England and Australia, which traditionally allowed only
three-judge panels, now also permit fewer judges to make decisions in certain types of cases to
conserve judicial resources. See Access to Justice Act, 1999, c. 22, § 59(2) (Eng.); Australian Law
Reform Comm'n, Report No. 89, Managing Justice: A Review of the Federal Civil Justice System
§ 7.41 (2000).
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Although it is possible that judges may be involved "behind the scenes" in these
decisions, the lack of individual accountability is worrisome. If judges cannot
be held accountable for their decisions, then the incentive to make well-reasoned
decisions decreases. Noting that the Eighth Circuit denied a stay to every person
in our sample who ultimately prevailed in his appeal, we question whether the
lack of individual accountability-or the frequency of decision-making by non-
judges in that circuit-may be actively contributing to erroneous decisions
without even the benefit of reducing delay. 151
2. Explanation of Reasoning
Writing a decision that explains the court's reasoning takes time. In drafting
published decisions, which carry the weight of precedent and affect the
reputations of their authors, judges generally strive to provide a coherent and
persuasive explanation of how they arrived at a particular result. 152 This is
especially likely to be true if they think that the issue may be reheard en banc or
reviewed by the Supreme Court, although such occurrences are quite rare. On
the other hand, the stakes are much lower in drafting unpublished decisions, as
well as the level of written explanation. 153 Unpublished decisions are criticized
as "potentially plagued by cursory reasoning, imprecise wording, and
incomplete fact descriptions."1 54 Although writing is time consuming, it also
helps to avoid making rushed decisions under pressure, which changes cognitive
processes in profound ways.155  Being in a hurry leads judges to use less
information, give more weight to negative information, and ultimately make less
accurate judgments. 156
151. The Eighth Circuit was also among the courts that offered no explanation whatsoever for
its decisions, which may exacerbate the risk of making poor decisions.
152. See Ahmed E. Taha, Publish or Paris? Evidence of How Judges Allocate Their Time,
6 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 1, 4 (2004).
153. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 165 (1996) (noting the criticism that
unpublished opinions encourage sloppy judicial decision-making); Brian T. Damman, Guess My
Weight: What Degree of Disparity is Currently Recognized Between Published and Unpublished
Opinions, and Does Equal Access to Each Form Justify Equal Authority for All?, 59 DRAKE L.
REv. 887, 912-13 (2011).
154. Niketh Velamoor, Proposed Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 to Require that
Circuits Allow Citation to Unpublished Opinions, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 561, 573-74 (2004).
155. Anne Edland & Ola Svenson, Judgment and Decision Making Under Time Pressure:
Studies and Findings, in TIME PRESSURE AND STRESS IN HUMAN JUDGMENT AND DECISION
MAKING 27, 36-37 (Ola Svenson & A. John Maule eds., 1993); see also Dan Zakay, The Impact
of Time Perception Processes on Decision Making under Time Stress, in TIME PRESSURE, supra,
at 59, 67 ("[D]ecision making under time stress is actually decision making with limited resources.
The noxious impact of limited resources on cognitive performance in various domains is well
documented. . . .").
156. Edland & Svenson, supra note 155, at 28-29, 36; see also Fatma E. Marouf, Implicit Bias
and Immigration Courts, 45 NEw ENG. L. REv. 417,431-32 (2011) (discussing how time, pressure,
and stress can have a negative impact on the decisions of immigration judges).
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Of course, many "unpublished" opinions are now publicly accessible on
databases such as Westlaw and Lexis, so judges may have more of an interest in
presenting a cogent explanation for their decisions. But the types of decisions
that we focus on here-interim decisions on stays of removal-are genuinely
unpublished and are available only through the cases' dockets in PACER. Most
of the orders on motions for stays that we looked analyzed little to no reasoning.
In fact, the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits almost
exclusively issued single sentence denials or grants of motions for stays.
Although these courts sometimes stated that the petitioner had failed to satisfy
the standard in Nken or a relevant circuit court case, they generally failed to
provide any explanation whatsoever. Similarly, the First, Third, and Tenth
Circuits frequently did not explain their rulings on motions for stay, although in
some cases the judges did provide a specific reason, such as failure to
demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits.
The Sixth Circuit was unique in routinely explaining its decisions on stays.
Its orders generally explained the type of relief that the petitioner was seeking,
summarized the arguments that the petitioner made in support of the stay, and
provided a brief analysis of those arguments. None of the other circuits that we
examined came close to this level of detail. The reasoned decisions that the
Sixth Circuit issues may contribute to the longer duration of appeals in that court
(an average of thirteen months, longer than any of the other circuits). At the
same time, the practice of issuing reasoned orders on stays likely contributes to
the Sixth Circuit's striking success in granting stays to all of the petitioners in
our sample who ultimately prevailed in their appeals. As Professor and law
school Dean Chris Guthrie and his colleagues explained, "the discipline of
opinion writing might enable well-meaning judges to overcome their intuitive,
impressionistic reactions" because judges generally will be more careful,
logical, and deductive in their decisions if they must write them. 157
Recognizing practical limitations, we do not suggest that courts should always
provide detailed decisions on stays, but we do recommend that they provide at
least some explanation. At a minimum, courts should explain which part(s) of
the four-factor test dictates the result. This minimal amount of reasoning would
clarify how the legal standard is being applied in circuits in which the standard
is currently ambiguous, increase accountability for these high stakes decisions,
and give practitioners an opportunity to learn how the court applies the doctrine.
In addition, requiring some explanation would help to prevent judges from
making decisions based on implicit bias or extraneous factors, such as
perceptions about high rates of asylum fraud among certain nationalities, instead
of engaging in an individualized analysis of the case at hand. 158 Writing a few
157. Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L.
REv. 1, 37 (2007) (citations omitted).
158. To what extent judges should consider the low base rate of success in immigration appeals
(around 10%) in assessing an individual appeal's likelihood of success is an interesting question.
Cases suggest that judges sometimes improperly rely on general information, such as reports about
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sentences or a short paragraph explaining the judge's reasoning should not be a
very time-consuming task, and it may lead to better-quality decision-making.
3. Reliance on Staff Attorneys
Deliberation takes time, but it has the power to change the outcome of a
decision. The nature and quality of deliberation often depends on the decision-
making procedures. In dealing with motions, including motions for stays of
removal, many courts rely heavily on staff attorneys to research and assess the
arguments and have adopted a case management, rather than deliberative,
approach. 159 Reliance on staff attorneys may improve efficiency, but it also has
the potential to compromise quality.
The role that staff attorneys play in briefing judges about the merits of motions
varies from circuit to circuit. In the Ninth Circuit, in which the correlation
between stays and petitions granted was weaker than in the Third and Sixth
Circuits, staff attorneys orally present the motions and proposed dispositions to
the judges. 160 Judges may request supporting documents before the screening
sessions, but very few do so. 161 Moreover, only in "complex matters" do the
motions attorneys prepare "legal memoranda" in advance of the oral
presentation. 162 Judges usually receive such materials at the screening panel
meeting, not in advance. 163 Staff attorneys in the Fourth, Seventh, and Tenth
Circuits also make oral presentations in some cases. 164
Oral presentations may compromise the accuracy of decision-making because
the judges are more likely to rely on intuition when listening than when reading,
the high incidence of fraud among Chinese asylum seekers, when assessing the merits of an
individual case. See Uchimiya, supra note 18, at 404-10. Yet the general cognitive tendency is to
neglect statistical base rates in predicting the likelihood of an event. See Chris Guthrie et al., Inside
the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 777, 810 (2001) (citing Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Evidential Impact of Base Rates, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY 153, 156-58
(Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982)) (arguing that "the representativeness heuristic might account
for judges' apparent preference for individuating evidence (e.g., eyewitness testimony) over
statistical evidence (e.g., base rates)").
159. Brett G. Scharffs, Law As Craft, 54 VAND. L. REv. 2245, 2320 (2001); see also ANTHONY
T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 342 (1993) (criticizing this way of thinking as transforming
judging from "statesmanship [to something] requiring only administrative skill").
160. 9TH CIR. GEN. ORDER 6.2(d); 9th Cir. Advisory Committee Note to R. 27-1(3). The
General Order indicates that "[flor some motions, the moving papers will be sent to the panel in
advance of presentation," suggesting that, in most cases, the judges do not see the written briefs
submitted by the parties. 9TH CIR. GEN. ORDER 6.2(d) (emphasis added).
161. Anna 0. Law, The Ninth Circuit's Internal Adjudicative Procedures and Their Effect on
Pro Se and Asylum Appeals, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 647, 674 (2011).
162. 9TH CIR. GEN. ORDER 6.2(d).
163. Law, supra note 161, at 674-75. If judges request more time to review a case, it is put
over only briefly (for a few hours or for a day). Id. at 675. Such requests are rare. Id.
164. Oakley, supra note 100, at 905-07. In the Fourth Circuit, as in the Ninth Circuit, staff
attorneys do not prepare explanatory memoranda, but instead orally present key facts and issues
and respond to questions from the judges. Id. at 906, 909. On the other hand, in the Tenth Circuit,
oral presentations supplement rather than supersede traditional bench memoranda. Id. at 906, 913.
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which can lead to errors in judgment. Judges may miss important points that
they would recognize if they had written documents that they could read
carefully and review later. As the Ninth Circuit's Chief Judge Alex Kozinski
acknowledged, "[a]fter you decide a few dozen such cases on a screening
calendar, your eyes glaze over, your mind wanders, and the urge to say O.K. to
whatever is put in front of you becomes almost irresistible."1 65 Other Ninth
Circuit judges have likewise expressed concerns about cases "'slipping through
the cracks' because they do not receive sufficient attention. 166  These
statements suggest that overreliance on the oral presentations of staff attorneys
may compromise the quality of decision-making.
Unfortunately, we could not measure how much time courts save by using
procedures such as oral presentation of motions by staff attorneys. Future
research is necessary in this area. However, even if these procedures
substantially increase efficiency, such gains do not justify allowing judges to
abdicate their role in evaluating motions that may result in the deportation-or
death-of the petitioner. 167 The high rate of false negatives and false positives
that we documented in stay adjudications underscores the need for greater
accountability in decision-making. Delegating these decisions to staff attorneys
whose work remains "silent, unseen, and unknown" undermines such
accountability. 168 Part of the solution may be to add more judges to the courts
of appeals rather than continue the long-time trend of adding more staff attorneys
and clerks, whose qualifications, experiences, and responsibilities differ
significantly from those of judges. 169
4. Consecutive Voting
The "round robin" style of voting may save time, but it also undercuts
deliberation. The internal operating procedures of both the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits specifically require such consecutive voting by the judges, rather than
collective deliberation. 170 The clerk prepares a single set of motions papers and
gives them to the initiating judge, who then transmits the file to the next judge
with a recommendation. 171 The second judge then makes a recommendation
and sends the file to the third judge, who returns the file with a final order to the
165. Penelope Pether, Sorcerers, Not Apprentices: How Judicial Clerks and Staff Attorneys
Impoverish U.S. Law, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 12-13 (2007).
166. Law, supra note 161, at 664.
167. Cf Charles E. Carpenter, Jr., The No-Citation Rule for Unpublished Opinions: Do the
Ends of Expediency for Overloaded Appellate Courts Justice the Means of Secrecy?, 50 S.C. L.
REv. 235, 246 (1998) ("Having a pre-hearing law clerk or staff attorney recast the facts, recast the
questions presented, recast the arguments of counsel, recommend a disposition, and draft an opinion
is an inappropriate filtering of advocacy and an inappropriate delegation of judicial
responsibility.").
168. Id. at 237-38.
169. Id. at 237.
170. 5TH CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING P. 27.5; 11TH CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING P. 1.
171. Id.
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clerk. 172 The Fourth Circuit has also standardized this "round robin"
approach. 173 In fact, we observed that the Fourth Circuit's orders on motions
for stay routinely stated that one judge issued the order, supported by other
judges. This suggests that one judge was really responsible for making the
decision while the other two simply signed on after the fact.
Some circuits use the "round robin" approach to decide the actual petitions
for review in immigration cases, as well as motions. 174 In the First and Second
Circuits-and possibly other circuits-the non-argument panels do not meet;
they simply receive the written materials, such as bench memoranda and
proposed summary orders prepared by staff attorneys, and then vote sequentially
on a piece of paper.1 7 5 As Second Circuit Judge Jon Newman explained, the
judges circulate a voting sheet with slots for "Judge 1," "Judge 2," and "Judge
3" and select an option to "refer the petition to the [regular argument calendar],
deny, grant, remand, or other."1 76 The judges on the panel rotate who fills each
slot, with each judge filling a different slot for one third of the week's cases. 177
Although the "round robin" approach is meant to increase efficiency, it
undermines the benefit of having a panel decide the case because the second and
third judges may be unduly influenced by the recommendations of the first
judge.17 8  Concern for collegiality makes judges "highly vulnerable to the
influence of one another."1 79 In addition, judges may be especially susceptible
to a pervasive cognitive bias known as "anchoring," which describes how initial
starting points disproportionately influence subsequent decisions. 80 Studies
show that presenting people with some initial value (the "anchor")
unconsciously leads them to make judgments closer to the anchor, even if that
anchor is completely irrelevant or extreme.18 1 Such studies have demonstrated
that anchoring affects judicial determinations of guilt and imposition of
172. See 5TH CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING P. 27.5; 11TH CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING P. 1. The
Ninth Circuit specifically rejected this serial screening model, and insisted on operating in
"parallel." See Oakley, supra note 100, at 876.
173. See Oakley, supra note 100, at 906.
174. Levy, supra note 101, at 350-52.
175. Id. at 351.
176. Id. at 350.
177. Id.
178. See Oakley, supra note 100, at 876 ("This system saves judicial time when the first judge
rejects the case from the screening docket without investment of time by the other judges, but once
the initiating judge has invested time in reviewing the case and preparing a proposed disposition,
the successive judges may feel less free to moot this effort by rejecting the case from the screening
docket.").
179. Edwards, supra note 135, at 1661; see also CASS SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED
DISSENT 166 (2003).
180. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 SC. 1124, 1128-29 (1974).
181. Id.
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sentences in criminal cases, 182 judicial bail determinations, 183 awards of
damages, 184 and negotiation outcomes.185
Anchoring occurs by priming the memory and selectively increasing the
accessibility of information consistent with the anchor. 186 Thus, a judge may
decide whether to agree with a recommendation to deny a motion for stay of
removal by mentally testing the possibility that the recommendation is
appropriate, which would involve selectively retrieving knowledge consistent
with that recommendation (for example, recalling the weaknesses of the case). 187
Because the judge relies primarily on easily accessible knowledge when it is
time to make a final decision, previous anchor-consistent knowledge greatly
influences his judgment.188 Empirical testing would be valuable to determine
whether the recommendations of fellow judges actually have this type of
anchoring effect. The process of sequential decision-making that the Fourth,
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits utilize may explain why these circuits failed to grant
stays in the vast majority of cases where the petitioner prevailed.189
By contrast, the Third Circuit, is the most "accurate" in terms of granting stays
to the petitioners who subsequently prevail on appeal while denying them to
most of the petitioners who ultimately lose, explicitly rejected the "round robin"
style of voting. 190 Although the Third Circuit judges do not necessarily meet as
a group to decide a motion, their court procedures provide more opportunity for
182. See Francisca Farina et al., Anchoring in Judicial Decision-Making, 7 PSYCHOL. IN SPAIN
56, 57, 60-61 (2003) (finding anchoring effects in judicial determinations of guilt and imposition
of sentences); see also Birte Englich & Thomas Mussweiler, Sentencing Under Uncertainty:
Anchoring Effects in the Courtroom, 31 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1535, 1540-41, 1544,
1546-47 (2001) (reporting that even highly experienced German criminal trial judges anchor
sentences to the demands of the prosecutor).
183. See Ebbe B. Ebbesen & Vladimir J. Konecni, Decision Making and Information
Integration in the Courts: The Setting of Bail, 32 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 805, 817-18
(1975) (finding that judges anchor heavily on prosecutors' bail recommendations, even after
controlling for defendants' criminal records, local ties, and the severity of the crimes).
184. See Guthrie et al., supra note 158, at 792 (finding that "the judges in [the] study relied on
an anchor-the $75,000 jurisdictional minimum raised by the motion to dismiss-to estimate
damage awards in a hypothetical personal-injury case"); Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Can Judges
Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberate Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV.
1251, 1285-91 (2005) (finding anchoring effects in the compensatory damages awarded by trial
judges, based on the demands made by the plaintiff's lawyer in the pre-trial settlement conference).
185. Dan Orr & Chris Guthrie, Anchoring, Information, Expertise, and Negotiation: New
Insights From Meta-Analysis, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 597, 621 (2006) (using a
meta-analysis to demonstrate that "anchoring has a powerful influence on negotiation outcomes").
186. Englich & Mussweiler, supra note 182, at 1548.
187. Id. (providing an analogous example of judges and criminal sentencing).
188. Id.
189. We note that the Eighth Circuit also had a high rate of false negatives; it failed to grant a
stay in any of the cases in which it granted a petition in our sample. It is not clear if the Eighth
Circuit also uses sequential voting.
190. Levy, supra note 101, at 351. The Third Circuit rejected "round robin" voting because of
concerns of undue influence. Id.
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original and independent analysis by each judge on the panel, both because they
do not vote consecutively and because they rely less on staff attorneys. 191 This
may contribute to the court's high level of accuracy in adjudicating stays.
Our data also raises questions about whether the "round robin" approach
actually speeds up the adjudication of appeals. If we set aside the Second
Circuit, which takes a particularly long time, the average duration of appeals in
the other circuits that we know use consecutive voting (the First, Fourth, Fifth,
and Eleventh) is about 7.5 months. This is faster than the Third Circuit, which
has rejected consecutive voting and takes an average of nine months to resolve
immigration appeals. If we include the Second Circuit, the average duration of
appeals in circuits that use consecutive voting increases to 8.4 months, which is
closer to the average duration in the Third Circuit. A better understanding of the
procedures used in the remaining circuits is necessary to assess whether the
"round robin" approach is really associated with faster decisions. However,
even assuming that consecutive voting helps process cases more quickly, a brief
reduction in delay may not justify an increased risk of error.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on our results, we make recommendations to the judiciary (the Supreme
Court and the U.S. Courts of Appeals) and the executive (the Department of
Justice and the Department of Homeland Security) branches.
A. Combining a Temporary Automatic Stay with an Effective Case
Management System
Relatively simple procedural reforms can go a long way to increase the
efficiency of the appeals process and improve the quality and consistency of
decisions on stays of removal. One crucial area for reform is the procedures that
courts use to identify frivolous or flawed appeals soon after they are filed. The
effective screening processes that some courts have developed can serve as
models for other courts. Promoting early identification of clearly flawed appeals
is the best way to prevent abuse of the legal process and preserve judicial
resources for evaluating meritorious cases. For example, courts should promptly
issue Orders to Show Cause in cases in which the court appears to lack
jurisdiction over the appeal, the petitioner has not paid the filing fee, or the case
has some other fatal flaw.
We recommend combining procedures for early screening of appeals with a
temporary automatic stay of removal to give the court the time necessary to make
a reasoned decision on a motion for stay. Although the two courts that currently
offer temporary automatic stays-the Second and Ninth Circuits-do receive far
more stay motions than other circuits, we found that stay motions, by
themselves, do not prolong the duration of an appeal. Given the overall high
191. Id. Immigration panels review all of the immigration cases in the Third Circuit; they are
not "screened" by staff attorneys.
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rates of false negatives and false positives that we have reported in our previous
study, 192 a temporary automatic stay would offer an important safety measure
against rushed decision-making.
This temporary stay can be implemented by adopting a rule similar to Ninth
Circuit General Order 6.4(c), which directs the court to rule on the merits of the
stay if the government opposes it. 193 To facilitate prompt decision-making, the
rule should include strict deadlines for filing a response and mandate that failure
to respond will be construed as non-opposition. Temporary automatic stays both
preserve judicial resources and protect petitioners by giving judges time to
search for the "needles in the haystack." If coupled with a mechanism to speed
the dismissal of flawed appeals, automatic temporary stays would not
unreasonably open the door to abusive appeals.
B. Using Prosecutorial Discretion Policies to Conserve Judicial Resources
The Second Circuit has challenged the government by recognizing that a
relatively small percentage of noncitizens with outstanding orders of removal
are actually deported from the United States. The court has raised compelling
questions about why the judiciary should spend precious resources adjudicating
immigration appeals filed by petitioners who are not a high priority for removal
under the Obama administration's prosecutorial discretion policies. 194  The
Second Circuit's approach of providing a ninety-day period for the government
and petitioner to attempt to agree on administrative closure should serve as a
good experiment to test whether the court's assertive stance by the court will
motivate the Department of Homeland Security to implement its own policies.
So far, only about 2% of removal cases nationwide have been administratively
closed under the prosecutorial discretion policies. 195
If the Department of Homeland Security refuses to administratively close
cases, an alternative (or complementary) approach would be for the Department
of Justice's Office of Immigration Litigation (OIL) to decline to oppose stay
motions filed by "low priority" petitioners. Because these individuals should
not be targeted for deportation in the first place, staying their removal should be
uncontroversial. This would test whether OIL is willing to change its practice
of actively opposing the vast majority of stay motions based on the Obama
administration's priorities. For example, OIL could establish a practice of filing
192. Marouf, Kagan & Gill, supra note 5, at 392.
193. 9TH CIR. GEN. ORDER 6.4(c).
194. See Morton Memorandum, supra note 127, at 1-2; see also Memorandum from John
Morton, Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs, to All Field Office Directors, All Special Agents
in Charge, All Chief Counsel 1-2 (June 17, 2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure
-communities/pdf/domestic-violence.pdf.
195. See ICE Prosecutorial Discretion Programs, TRAC IMMIGRATION,
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/287/ (last updated June 28, 2012) (finding that the number
of prosecutorial discretion cases amounted to only 1.9% of the 298,173 cases that were pending
before immigration courts as of the end of September 2012).
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prompt notices of non-opposition to stay motions in cases in which the petitioner
has no criminal record, does not represent a threat to public safety, or otherwise
does not fall into any of the "high priority" categories.196
As Justice Kennedy observed in Nken, empirical data is essential for courts to
find a balanced approach to adjudicating immigration appeals. 197 We have
attempted to fill this need by analyzing PACER data. However, the government
can assist the courts by publishing the percentage of removal orders issued by
immigration judges that are actually executed each year. If, as the Second
Circuit suggests, the number is quite small, concerns about the appeals process
resulting in undue delay of deportations would be greatly undermined.
C. Adopting a Flexible Stay Standard that Minimizes Errant Deportations
Our study has shown that immigration appeals usually take well under one
year and that the appeals that seem most likely to be abusive-those dismissed
for jurisdictional and procedural reasons-have especially short lives. We have
also observed that many flawed appeals are dismissed in less than three months.
This suggests that courts should prioritize preventing false negatives over
preventing false positives because deportations in weak appeals are likely to be
delayed by only a matter of months. The sliding scale approach, which
correlates to a reduction in the rate of false negatives from 57% to 28%, achieves
this result. 198
D. Deterring Abusive Appeals by Detecting Problematic Patterns of Behavior
Rather than Trying to Scrutinize Individual Cases
Courts have a hard time defining, much less identifying, "frivolous" appeals.
Looking for problematic patterns of behavior by repeat players is a more
effective way to weed out abusive appeals than engaging in the impossible task
of assessing the merits of an individual case at the onset of litigation to determine
whether the arguments are genuinely frivolous or just weak. Issuing local rules
aimed at discouraging and sanctioning behavior, such as failing to file timely
briefs or respond to Orders to Show Cause, is an effective first step. Those local
rules can then be combined with Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 46 and
38, as the Second Circuit has done, to discipline and sanction attorneys who
engage in a pattern of abusive behavior. 199 The goal is to ensure that the court's
case management procedures keep track of each missed deadline or withdrawn
appeal in a meaningful way. Courts could consider publishing periodic reports
with the names of attorneys who have three or more incidents of problematic
196. In Justice on the Fly, we not only found high rates of opposition in most circuits, but also
that the government had opposed the motion for stay in the majority of cases in which it
subsequently filed a motion to remand, acknowledging that the appeal had merit. See Marouf,
Kagan & Gill, supra note 5, at 378.
197. Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1762-63 (2009) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
198. Marouf, Kagan & Gill, supra note 5, at 389.
199. See2D CIR.R. 38.1.
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behavior (for example, three missed deadlines for filing briefs) in order to ensure
that abusive behavior it promptly detected.
E. Reexamining the Procedures Used to Rule on Motions
Although different courts have different procedures for ruling on motions,
there has been little empirical research on how these various procedures actually
affect the efficiency and the quality of decision-making. Courts must give these
issues serious consideration. For instance, courts should write a minimum of a
few sentences of specific reasoning for decisions on motions. 200 Additionally,
courts that use the "round robin" method of voting should to assess how much
time is really saved by this practice and to evaluate the potential risks associated
with it. Courts should also examine their level of reliance on staff attorneys,
including reliance on oral presentations by staff to rule on motions. Finally,
courts should not allow clerks to sign decisions on motions for stays of removal.
This practice not only contradicts the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure but
also undermines judicial accountability.
IV. CONCLUSION
Commentators have expressed concerns about dilatory, delay-seeking
behavior by litigants for over a hundred years. 20 1  Yet few scholars have
empirically explored the actual speed of judicial decision-making. 202
Consequently, perceptions about the duration of appeals are often based on false
assumptions rather than facts and may be clouded by explicit or implicit biases
related to the nature of the appeal. There is a particular risk of distortion with
cases that reach the Supreme Court because such cases take a particularly long
period of time to resolve. By contrast, the far larger number of cases dismissed
on non-merits grounds early in the process are typically invisible. It is a well-
known maxim that the wheels of justice turn slowly. But as it turns out, justice
is often administered with a fair degree of efficiency.
Immigration appeals seem particularly susceptible to misperceptions about
delay due to popular notions about noncitizens filing fraudulent applications.
However, our study shows that noncitizens cannot routinely buy a significant
amount of time in the United States simply by filing a federal court appeal. We
have shown that immigration appeals in the federal courts generally take well
under a year, and that those appeals most likely to be frivolous are usually
200. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Processing Pleadings and the Psychology ofPrejudgment, 60
DEPAUL L. REv. 413, 421 (2011) ("Slow, careful, deliberative processes are the key to sound
judgment, not snap intuition.").
201. See supra note 27.
202. See Miles, supra note 92, at 324 ("The speed of court decision-making deserves more
study.... Basic facts about how the speed of decision-making varies across circuits, areas of law,
and their intersection with judicial experience await exploration."). Miles's article is one of the
few empirical pieces addressing this topic.
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dismissed in less than six months. Many are even dismissed in less than three
months.
To be clear, immigration adjudication in the United States does take
considerable time, but most of that time is taken by the first instance adjudication
within the Department of Justice's Immigration Courts. Cases pend in
immigration courts nationwide for an average 550 days. 203 In California alone,
the average immigration court delay is 700 days. 204 This data suggests that the
federal appeals stage may actually be the fastest part of the removal process.
Those concerned with delay should focus their attention on how long cases are
taking in immigration courts, in which judges regularly continue cases for years.
Both the government and immigrants with meritorious cases have a shared
interest in making this process more efficient. 205
Our conclusion has implications for how aggressively the Department of
Justice should fight motions for stays of removal, how liberally courts should
grant them, and what doctrinal approach they should adopt. If appeals do not
take very long and judges cannot predict cases will succeed, courts should set a
flexible standard for stays and only allow the government to oppose stays in
cases that clearly abusive. 206
Instead of focusing on stays as an obstacle to immigration enforcement, the
government should direct its energy toward ensuring that courts have the
resources and procedures in place to process cases efficiently. Our results
demonstrate that courts with effective case management systems are able to
quickly identify and dismiss cases with fatal flaws, thereby resolving the
government's concern about undue delay. Our study suggests that both case
management and traditional doctrine must play a role in adjudication.
Unfortunately, the critical role of case management in the administration of
justice is not a traditional subject of legal scholarship and appellate judges are
often unaware of how other courts manage cases. 207
203. Latest Immigration Court Numbers, As OfJanuary 2013, TRAC IMMIGRATION (February
13, 2013), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/308/. TRAC reports that "[u]nclosed cases now
in the Court's backlog have already been waiting on average about a year and a half (550 days) and
typically will need to wait considerably longer before they are resolved." Id.; see also Immigration
Court Backlog Tool, TRAC IMMIGRATION, http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court
backlog/ (last visited May 22, 2014) (tracking the average length of immigration cases across the
country).
204. Immigration Court Backlog Tool, supra note 203.
205. Figures from November 2013 show that cases in which relief was granted in the
immigration court took on average 869 days, cases that were closed due to prosecutorial discretion
took 875 days, and those that were terminated took 561 days, whereas those in which a removal
order was issued took only 261 days. Id.
206. See Marouf, Kagan & Gill, supra note 5, 398-99.
207. See Levy, supra note 101, at 317-18 (discussing the void in knowledge about federal
appellate courts' case management systems and analyzing the practice of five circuits using
qualitative research from a series of interviews).
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Recognizing the importance of proper court staffing and procedures is
particularly important. The federal courts' budgets were slashed by 8% during
federal sequestration. 208 Such cuts mean that the judiciary must eliminate
roughly one quarter of its workforce, which will delay court proceedings and
compromise the justice system. 209 These changes do not bode well for either
noncitizens or the Justice Department. Reduced staff coupled with an ever-
increasing caseload could result in lower-quality decision-making, which may
in turn lead to more stay denials in cases that ultimately prevail on appeal.
Our results call out for more research on court administration as an integral
part of our system of law, and suggest that mundane matters such as how courts
sort their dockets can and should have a significant impact on legal doctrine. If
concerns about delay are exaggerated, then it follows that procedural standards
designed to prevent abuse of the process may be calibrated too strictly. On the
specific matter of immigration appeals, this new data suggests that the
government's arguments to the Supreme Court in Nken were founded on
fundamentally false assumptions.
208. See Bruce Moyer, January-February 2013: Federal Courts Brace for Budget Cuts, FED.
B. Ass'N, http://www.fedbar.org/Advocacy/Washington-Watch/WW-Archives/2013/January
-February-2013-Federal-Courts-Brace-for-Budget-Cuts.aspx (last visited May 22, 2014).
209. Id.; see also Chad Bray, Federal Judges Express 'Grave Concern' Over Budget Cuts,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 15, 2013, 6:51 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2013/08/15/federal-judges
-express-grave-corncern-over-budget-cuts/; Justice Sequestered, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2013, at 10.
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APPENDIX A
The linear regression model below helps to analyze various factors that play
a role in predicting the duration of appeals. In this model, the coefficient
indicates the deviation that can be attributed to a single factor if all of the other
factors are held equal (for example, -2.5 means that the presence of the factor
will reduce the duration of the case by two and a half months, all other things
being equal). The variables marked with stars are those for which there is a
statistically significant correlation, with three stars indicating a stronger
correlation.
FIGURE 8: LINEAR REGRESSION MODEL PREDICTING DURATION OF CASE IN
MONTHS
Robust
Coef. Std. Err. t Score P > Itl
Stay Requested 0.3442 0.4215 0.82 .414
Stay Granted -0.2556 0.6159 -0.41 .678
Government -0.6768 0.4707 -1.44 .151
Opposed Stay
Procedural or -2.8126 0.4041 -6.96 .000 *
Jurisdictional
(Non-Merits)
Dismissal
Voluntary -3.2817 0.5419 -6.06 .000
Dismissal
Petition Granted 0.0390 0.5826 0.07 .947
IFP Filed -1.6798 0.6354 -2.64 .008 **
IFP Granted 0.7423 0.4650 1.60 .111
Pro Se Litigant -1.8479 0.4107 -4.50 .000
Asylum Case 1.3226 0.3755 3.52 .000
Oral Arguments 3.1444 0.6171 5.10 .000 *
Panel Party -0.5503 0.3764 -1.46 .144
Unanimity
Female on Panel 1.0130 0.3609 2.81 .005 **
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Constant 8.3448 0.6333 13.83 .000 *
N= 1098; F(23,1074) = 27.55, p=.000; R2= .37; Adj. R2= .36; Root MSE =
4.49
tUnreported fixed effects circuit variation available upon request (Wald
F(10,1074) = 11.39 ***)
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APPENDIX B
This model analyzes only those cases that the court decided on the merits,
excluding those dismissed on procedural or jurisdictional grounds.
FIGURE 9: LINEAR REGRESSION MODEL OF DURATION OF CASES DECIDED ON
THE MERITS (IN MONTHS)
Robust
Coef. Std. Err. t Score P > Itl
Stay Requested 1.6509 0.6449 2.56 .011 *
Stay Granted -0.1043 0.7689 -0.14 .892
Government -1.3588 0.7187 -1.89 .059
Opposed Stay
Petition Granted -0.3518 0.5994 -0.59 .558
IFP Filed -2.2180 1.4485 -1.53 .126
IFP Granted 0.6853 0.5648 1.21 .225
Pro Se Litigant -2.5405 0.5704 -4.45 .000
Asylum Case 0.9993 0.4044 2.47 .014 **
Oral Arguments 3.7063 0.6710 5.52 .000 *
Panel Party -0.1134 0.4714 -0.24 .810
Unanimity
Female on Panel 1.2418 0.4164 2.98 .003 **
Constant 7.2967 0.7165 10.18 .000 *
N= 610; F(21,618) = 11.12, p=.000; R2 = .29; Adj. R2= .27; Root MSE =
4.70
tUnreported fixed effects circuit variation available upon request (Wald
F(10,618) = 13.11 ***)
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APPENDIX C
FIGURE 10: BIVARIATE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STAY GRANT RATE AND
AVERAGE DURATION
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